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Articles 
HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
WHAT’S THE USE? 
MATTHEW D. ADLER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Subjective well-being (SWB) surveys ask respondents to quantify 
their overall or momentary happiness or life-satisfaction, or pose 
similar questions about other aspects of respondents’ mental states. A 
large empirical literature in economics and psychology has grown up 
around such surveys. Increasingly, too, scholars have advanced the 
normative proposal that SWB surveys be used for policymaking—for 
example, by using survey results to calculate monetary equivalents for 
nonmarket goods (to be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis), or to 
calculate “gross national happiness.” 
  This Article skeptically evaluates the policy role of SWB data. It is 
critical to distinguish between (1) using SWB surveys as evidence of 
preference utility versus (2) using them as evidence of experience 
utility. Preference utility is a measure of the extent to which someone 
has realized her preferences; experience utility, a measure of the 
quality of someone’s mental states. The two are quite different 
because individuals can have preferences regarding non-mental 
occurrences. 
  Having drawn this distinction, the Article then argues, first, that 
SWB surveys are poor evidence of preference utility—given problems 
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of preference and scale heterogeneity, as well as other difficulties. 
Stated-preference surveys are a much better survey format for eliciting 
preference utility. Second, in considering SWB surveys as an 
experience-utility measure, we should recognize that 
“experientialism” about well-being—the view that well-being is simply 
a matter of good experiences—is highly controversial. More plausibly, 
an experience-utility measure might be seen as an indicator of one 
aspect of well-being. However, even constructing this “weak” 
experience-utility measure is not straightforward—as the Article 
demonstrates by discussing Daniel Kahneman’s detailed proposal for 
such a metric. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Happiness” is all the rage. A fast-growing literature in 
economics, growing out of work by research psychologists concerning 
positive psychological states, examines the determinants of 
individuals’ happiness or feelings of satisfaction with their lives.1 
Much work in this literature, often referred to as the literature on 
subjective well-being (SWB), is based upon large-scale surveys, 
posing questions such as, “Taken all together, would you say that you 
are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” Or, “All things 
considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your life these 
days? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very 
dissatisfied and 10 means very satisfied.” A respondent’s answer to 
such a question can then be correlated with information about other 
attributes, ascertained by additional questions—for example, her 
income, relative income, employment status, whether she is married 
or has children, her health condition, and so forth. 
 
 1. For overviews, see generally LUIGINO BRUNI & PIER LUIGI PORTA, ECONOMICS AND 
HAPPINESS: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS (2005); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN 
ECONOMICS (2008); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW 
THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS (Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2007); THE SCIENCE OF 
WELL-BEING (Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne eds., 2005); WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz 
eds., 1999); Ed Diener, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas & Heidi L. Smith, Subjective Well-
Being: Three Decades of Progress, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1999); Paul Dolan, Tessa Peasgood 
& Mathew White, Do We Really Know What Makes Us Happy? A Review of the Economic 
Literature on the Factors Associated with Subjective Well-Being, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 94 
(2008). 
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Table 1 excerpts the questions about happiness or life 
satisfaction that are posed by the surveys most widely used by SWB 
researchers.2 
Table 1. Widely Used SWB Questions 
Survey Variable Question
General Social 
Survey 
Happiness 
Taken all together, how would you say things are these 
days? Would you say that you are very happy, pretty 
happy, or not too happy? 
World Values 
Survey 
Life sat. 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help 
with your answer. [range of 1-10 with 1 labelled “Very 
Dissatisfied” and 10 labelled “Very Satisfied”] 
European Social 
Survey 
Happiness 
Taking all things together, how happy would you say 
you are? Please use this card [range of 0-10 with 0 
labelled “Extremely unhappy” and 10 labelled 
“Extremely happy”] 
European Social 
Survey 
Life sat. 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this 
card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 
means extremely satisfied. [range of 0-10 with 0 
labelled “Extremely dissatisfied” and 10 labelled 
“Extremely satisfied”] 
European 
Quality of Life 
Survey 
Happiness 
Taking all things together on a scale of 1 of 10, how 
happy would you say you are? Here 1 means you are 
very unhappy and 10 means you are very happy. 
European 
Quality of Life 
Survey 
Life sat. 
All things considered, how satisfied would you say you 
are with your life these days? Please tell me on a scale 
of 1 to 10, where 1 means very dissatisfied and 10 
means very satisfied.
German Socio-
Economic Panel 
Life sat. 
In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your 
satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer 
according to the following scale: 0 means ‘completely 
dissatisfied’, 10 means ‘completely satisfied’. How 
satisfied are you with your life, all things considered? 
British 
Household 
Panel Survey 
Life sat. 
How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life 
overall? [range of 1-7 with 1 labelled “Not satisfied at 
all” and 7 labelled “Completely satisfied”.]
 
 2. The table is taken from Richard R. Layard, G. Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal 
Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 1848 tbl.1 (2008). Many thanks to Marc Fleurbaey for 
the reference.  
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Some SWB researchers have objected to these standard 
questions, which invite respondents to express their overall happiness 
or life satisfaction, that is, to reflect on all the circumstances of their 
lives, and then to quantify their happiness or life satisfaction with 
these total circumstances in view. Daniel Kahneman, most 
prominently, has argued that SWB surveys should focus instead on 
moment-to-moment happiness.3 The trajectory of an individual’s 
momentary happiness over a given time period can be estimated via 
“experience sampling”4: she will be given a small electronic device 
which will periodically beep, prompting her to quantify her happiness 
at that moment. Alternatively, and somewhat less intrusively, a 
survey might employ the so-called “day reconstruction method.”5 At 
the end of each day during the survey period, respondents will be 
asked to recollect the episodes of the day and to rate the affective 
quality of each episode.6 
Kahneman and collaborators used the day-reconstruction 
method in a study of working women in Texas.7 Respondents were 
asked to assign each episode a number from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very 
much) on various scales—for example, how “happy” she felt during 
the episode, how “warm/friendly,” how “frustrated/annoyed,” or how 
“depressed/blue.”8 A measure of the respondent’s “positive affect” 
during the episode was calculated by averaging how she rated the 
episode on three of the scales (happy, warm/friendly, enjoyment), and 
her “negative affect” during the episode was similarly calculated by 
averaging her ratings on six other scales (frustrated/annoyed, 
depressed/blue, hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile, worried/
anxious, criticized/put down). 
The questions posed by Kahneman and collaborators in the 
Texas study are certainly different, in some respects, from the 
questions summarized in Table 1. For that matter, “How happy are 
 
 3. See infra note 176; see also infra Part III.B. 
 4. Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. 
Stone, National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 30–31 
(Alan B. Krueger ed., 2009). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. 
Stone, A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction 
Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1776–77 (2004).  
 8. Id. at 1777 tbl.1. 
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you?” is not semantically equivalent to “How satisfied are you with 
your life?” We might expect to see (and indeed do see) a somewhat 
different pattern of responses to happiness versus life-satisfaction 
questions.9 Still, questions regarding momentary happiness, 
momentary affects, overall happiness, or overall life satisfaction share 
a crucial similarity: all ask the respondent to consider some aspect of 
her mental life and to rate that aspect on a numerical scale or, nearly 
equivalently, to assign that aspect to one of a series of ordered 
categories. For short, I will call any such survey a “SWB” survey and 
data or research grounded on such surveys “SWB” data or research. 
Note that my definition includes the surveys understood by 
researchers as paradigmatic SWB surveys, namely the surveys in 
Table 1, as well as questions such as, “How angry are you right 
now?,” “How painful is this?,” or “How happy did you feel when you 
were doing that?” 
Scholars working in the SWB literature tend to be empiricists—
psychologists or empirical economists who use sophisticated 
econometric techniques to tease out the causal connections that SWB 
data might illuminate. However, by no means has the literature been 
wholly empirical and non-normative. Strikingly, many of the leading 
researchers have also advanced normative recommendations 
regarding government policy.10 They have drawn upon SWB research 
 
 9. See Ed Diener, Weiting Ng, James Harter & Raksha Arora, Wealth and Happiness 
Across the World: Material Prosperity Predicts Life Evaluation, Whereas Psychosocial Prosperity 
Predicts Positive Feeling, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 58–60 (2010); Daniel 
Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional 
Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,489 (2010). 
 10. Scholarship endorsing the use of SWB surveys for law or policy purposes includes 
DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM THE NEW 
RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010); ED DIENER, RICHARD E. LUCAS, ULRICH SCHIMMACK & 
JOHN F. HELLIWELL, WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2009); FREY, supra note 1; FREY & 
STUTZER, supra note 1; CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF 
WELL-BEING (2011); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (rev. & 
updated ed. 2011); MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4; 
Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan 
S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen, Buccafusco 
and Masur, Welfare as Happiness]; John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. 
Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) [hereinafter 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis]; Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, 
Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2004); Ed 
Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index, 55 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34 (2000); Paul Dolan & Mathew P. White, How Can Measures of 
Subjective Well-Being Be Used To Inform Public Policy?, 2 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 71 (2007); 
Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 405 
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either to advocate particular policy measures or to argue for new 
kinds of policy-evaluation tools. 
Two such tools have received sustained scholarly attention. The 
first is the use of SWB data to determine monetary equivalents for 
nonmarket goods, with these equivalents then incorporated in cost-
benefit analysis.11 Imagine that regression techniques are used to 
estimate an equation from survey data, whereby an individual’s life 
satisfaction measured on a numerical scale is the dependent variable 
and various independent variables are given, including both an 
individual’s income and her level of some nonmarket good. The 
coefficient on income is cy, meaning that an increase in income by $1 
is estimated to produce cy units of increase in life satisfaction, whereas 
the coefficient on the nonmarket good is cG, meaning that an increase 
of 1 unit in an individual’s level of the good is estimated to produce cG 
units of increase in life satisfaction. The monetary equivalent for 1 
unit of the good is thus cG/cy dollars.
12  
 
(2010); and Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur 
Stone, Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 429 
(2004). For further such scholarship, see infra notes 11, 13. 
 11. For overviews of this approach, see DANIEL FUJIWARA & ROSS CAMPBELL, DEP’T 
FOR WORK & PENSIONS (UK), VALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS: STATED PREFERENCE, REVEALED PREFERENCE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
APPROACHES (2011); Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for 
Measuring How Life Events Affect Happiness, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1139 (2002); Bruno S. 
Frey, Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to Environmental 
Valuation, 2 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 139 (2010); Heinz Welsch & Jan Kühling, Using 
Happiness Data for Environmental Valuation: Issues and Applications, 23 J. ECON. SURVS. 385 
(2009); and Paul Dolan, Daniel Fujiwara & Robert Metcalfe, A Step Towards Valuing Utility the 
Marginal and Cardinal Way (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1062, 2011). 
Recent examples include Christopher L. Ambrey & Christopher M. Fleming, Valuing Scenic 
Amenity Using Life Satisfaction Data, 72 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 106 (2011); Arik Levinson, 
Valuing Public Goods Using Happiness Data: The Case of Air Quality, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 869 
(2012); Tobias Menz & Heinz Welsch, Life-Cycle and Cohort Effects in the Valuation of Air 
Quality: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data, 88 LAND ECON. 300 (2012); and Nattavudh 
Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price Tags on the Same Health 
Condition: Re-Evaluating the Well-Being Valuation Approach, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 1032 (2011). 
 12. An increase in income by cG/cy dollars produces cy(cG/cy) = cG increase in happiness, and 
thus is the equivalent, in happiness terms, of an increase in exposure to the good by 1 unit. 
  Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur have recently proposed that policies be evaluated 
via “well-being analysis” (WBA), whereby policy impacts, including income changes, would be 
converted into happiness units. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 
supra note 10, at 1627–40; Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra note 
10, at Part II. Although this proposal has some similarities to the use of SWB data to calculate 
monetary equivalents for nonmarket goods, it differs from the latter in important respects. First, 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur adopt the “experience-quality” (EQ) defense of SWB 
surveys, indeed the strong EQ defense—to use a distinction I will develop later in the Article, 
ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  2:56 PM 
1516 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1509 
Substantial scholarly work along these lines has been 
undertaken, using SWB data to estimate monetary equivalents for 
various goods and bads—including air quality, airport noise, other 
environmental goods, the death of family members, social 
relationships, exposure to the risk of crime or terrorism, and 
unemployment. 
Second, scholars have worked toward developing an SWB-
survey-based index of social condition akin to gross domestic product 
(GDP).13 (The desire to develop such an index is, in part, what has 
motivated Kahneman’s research.) The idea here is to have a measure 
of individual happiness that can be added across persons.14 We could 
then estimate the gross national happiness or average happiness of a 
country at a given time. We could also look at time trends in 
gross/average happiness, characterize international or inter-group 
differences in gross/average happiness, and use such a measure to 
assess particular policies by predicting the change in gross/average 
happiness that these policies would yield. 
Governments have also begun to gather SWB data and to initiate 
serious bureaucratic and even political discussions about the 
possibility of SWB-survey-based policymaking. The Kingdom of 
Bhutan has long endorsed the concept of “Gross National 
 
see infra Part I.C. They see WBA as a way to take account of the information that SWB surveys 
provide about individuals’ experience utility. By contrast, scholars using the monetary-
equivalent approach do not universally adopt the EQ defense, at least not explicitly so. One 
possible reading of some of this scholarship is that it adopts the “preference-realization” (PR) 
defense: that the monetary-equivalent approach is meant to be sensitive to the information 
SWB surveys provide concerning preference utility. See infra Part I.C. Indeed, Part II discusses 
the monetary-equivalent approach, at length, as a test case for the PR defense of SWB surveys. 
  Second, WBA requires cardinal happiness data; the monetary-equivalent approach 
requires only ordinal data. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra 
note 10, at Part II.B.4; infra Part II.A.3. Finally, WBA neutralizes wealth effects, whereas (in 
principle) the monetary-equivalent approach does not. To see this point, imagine that some 
nonmarket good has the very same effect on SWB for both rich and poor, and that money has a 
diminishing incremental effect. Then WBA will be neutral between a policy that provides the 
good for free to some number of rich individuals and one that does so for the same number of 
poor individuals, taxing some third population, whereas the monetary-equivalent approach will 
(in principle) favor the first policy. 
 13. See generally MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4; 
Diener & Seligman, supra note 10; Kahneman et al., supra note 10; Ruut Veenhoven, Happy 
Life-Expectancy: A Comprehensive Measure of Quality-of-Life in Nations, 39 SOC. INDICATORS 
RES. 1 (1996); Ruut Veenhoven & Wim Kalmijn, Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations: 
Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism Married in a New Index of Societal Performance, 6 J. 
HAPPINESS STUD. 421 (2005). 
 14. For discussion of cardinality and ordinality, see infra Part II.A.3.  
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Happiness” and has used it in guiding economic development.15 Until 
recently, such happiness-oriented governance seemed highly 
idiosyncratic. In 2008, however, the president of France, Nicholas 
Sarkozy, commissioned the influential Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report to 
investigate non-GDP measures of social welfare. The report 
recommended (inter alia) SWB surveys: 
  Research has shown that it is possible to collect meaningful and 
reliable data on subjective as well as objective well-being. Subjective 
well-being encompasses different aspects (cognitive evaluations of 
one’s life, happiness, satisfaction, positive emotions such as joy and 
pride, and negative emotions such as pain and worry): each of them 
should be measured separately to derive a more comprehensive 
appreciation of people’s lives. Quantitative measures of these 
subjective aspects hold the promise of delivering not just a good 
measure of quality of life per se, but also a better understanding of 
its determinants, reaching beyond people’s income and material 
conditions. Despite the persistence of many unresolved issues, these 
subjective measures provide important information about quality of 
life. Because of this, the types of question that have proved their 
value within small-scale and unofficial surveys should be included in 
larger-scale surveys undertaken by official statistical offices.16 
The Cameron government in the United Kingdom has welcomed the 
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report,17 and statistical bureaus in the United 
Kingdom are now implementing a program of SWB surveys.18 This 
also appears to be in the offing in France and in the United States. 
But do SWB surveys really offer a new foundation for 
governmental policy? In this Article, I critically interrogate the 
 
 15. See Winton Bates, Gross National Happiness, 23 ASIAN-PAC. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 12 
(2009). 
 16. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE 
COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 
16 (2009), available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf. 
 17. PAUL DOLAN, RICHARD LAYARD & ROBERT METCALFE, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., 
MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 3 (2011). 
 18. See PAUL DOLAN & ROBERT METCALFE, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., COMPARING 
MEASURES OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND VIEWS ABOUT THE ROLE THEY SHOULD PLAY 
IN POLICY (2011); DOLAN ET AL., supra note 17 at 3; OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., FIRST ANNUAL 
ONS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING RESULTS (2012), available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_272294.pdf; SAM WALDRON, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., 
MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING IN THE UK (2010). 
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normative recommendations of SWB researchers (and the Stiglitz-
Sen-Fitoussi report).19  
A key difficulty is a lack of rigor and care in handling relevant 
normative concepts, such as “well-being,” “preference satisfaction,” 
and “utility.” Relatedly, the SWB literature has largely failed to 
engage with contemporary philosophical scholarship on well-being. 
To be sure, this lack of engagement is reciprocal, and it is not 
particularly surprising, given academic specialization. SWB research 
has been spearheaded, as mentioned, by psychologists and empirically 
minded economists. The standard methods of moral philosophers—
conceptual analysis, intuition-pumping via simple and unrealistic 
thought experiments—are unfamiliar in these social-scientific realms. 
But now that SWB scholarship has moved beyond the 
boundaries of social science, from the explanatory to the normative—
to a posture of endorsing particular governmental policies, policy-
evaluation approaches, or SWB measures as the basis for such 
approaches—its methods require supplementation too. A more 
precise and nuanced engagement with different possible conceptions 
of well-being is needed. This Article tries to exemplify, and in any 
event seeks to encourage, such engagement. 
Part I reviews the philosophical literature, seeking to clarify 
crucial distinctions that are all too often blurred by SWB scholars: 
between well-being and a particular, experientialist, conception of 
well-being (for example, the view that well-being is just happiness); 
between the satisfaction of someone’s preferences (how well actual 
conditions in the world fit with her preference ranking) and the fact 
that the individual feels satisfied; between utility in the traditional 
economic sense, a measure of preference satisfaction, and experience 
utility, a measure of the individual’s happiness, positive affects, or 
feelings of satisfaction. 
 
 19. For other, important, critical work on SWB surveys, see the chapters by George 
Loewenstein, William Nordhaus, and Erik Hurst in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-
BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4; MARC FLEURBAEY & DIDIER BLANCHET, BEYOND GDP: 
MEASURING WELFARE AND ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
ch. 5) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Daniel M. Hausman, Hedonism and Welfare 
Economics, 26 ECON. & PHIL. 321 (2010); Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the 
Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391 (2005); George Loewenstein & Peter A. 
Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. 
PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science 
of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553 (2010); and Marc Fleurbaey, Erik Schockkaert & Koen Decancq, 
What Good Is Happiness? (Ctr. for Operations Res. & Econometrics, Discussion Paper No. 17, 
2009). 
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Part I concludes by differentiating two quite distinct roles that 
SWB surveys might play as inputs to policy choice. First, a SWB 
survey might evidence the degree to which an individual’s preferences 
are satisfied. I will term this the “preference-realization” (PR) 
defense of SWB surveys. Let it be understood (a point I will repeat 
below) that, on a standard preference-based account of well-being, 
the fundamental arguments for an individual’s preferences—what she 
intrinsically prefers and disprefers—might well include items external 
to her mind, such as her physical health, her accumulation of material 
goods, her freedom and autonomy, her accomplishments, and so 
forth. Second, an SWB survey might indicate the quality of an 
individual’s mental states. It might tell us whether her mental states 
are good or bad in some sense, for example, whether she feels happy 
or distressed. I call a normative defense of SWB surveys predicated 
on this role the “experience-quality” (EQ) defense. 
Kahneman, clearly and decisively, presses the EQ defense. He 
sees a (properly constructed) SWB survey as indicating whether the 
individual is currently experiencing a positive or negative affective 
state and, in either event, how intense it is. Other researchers, 
however, seem to see SWB surveys as evidence of preference 
realization. Still others offer both defenses, often without 
acknowledging that the two involve quite different accounts of what 
information SWB surveys are supposed to be providing. 
The distinction between PR and EQ defenses of the policy 
relevance of SWB data clarifies normative discussion. It is a 
distinction with a difference—a distinction that SWB scholars would 
do well to notice—and a distinction that will serve as the organizing 
template for this Article. In Part II, I consider, and reject, the PR 
defense. In Part III, I consider the EQ defense—here drawing a 
further line between “strong” and “weak” variants. The strong 
variant of the EQ defense, adopted by Richard Layard in his 
influential book on happiness,20 adopts an experientialist view of well-
being. Experientialism about well-being is a controversial view. It 
says that, necessarily, an individual is equally well-off in two 
outcomes if she has the same mental states in both (even if the 
condition of her physical body, or facts about the wider world, are 
different in the two outcomes). 
 
 20. LAYARD, supra note 10. For a description and critique of Layard’s views, see infra Part 
III.A. 
ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  2:56 PM 
1520 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1509 
The weak variant of the EQ defense, now favored by Kahneman, 
acknowledges the possibility of nonexperiential constituents of well-
being, but stresses that happiness or, more generally, mental states, 
are at least one important aspect of human flourishing.21 The weak 
EQ defense is by far the most plausible basis for incorporating SWB 
data into policy analysis. Even this defense of the policy relevance of 
SWB surveys, however, is vulnerable to substantial criticisms. I will 
flesh out these criticisms via a close analysis of Kahneman’s work. 
Part III will conclude by articulating a different methodology for 
taking account of the impact of governmental policies on individuals’ 
mental states, a methodology that does not rely upon SWB surveys. 
The aims of the Article, thus, are both conceptual and 
substantive. First, it articulates distinctions that are useful in thinking 
carefully about the normative relevance of SWB surveys—above all, 
the distinction between PR and EQ defenses. Second, it argues 
substantively that neither the PR defense nor the EQ defense, in even 
its weak form, is convincing. The second aspect of the Article is 
separable from the first. Even if the reader is not persuaded by my 
various critiques of SWB surveys, she will still agree (I hope) that it is 
vital to differentiate the potential role of SWB surveys as evidence of 
preference utility (the PR defense) from their role as evidence of 
experience utility (the EQ defense).22 
 
 21. See infra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 22. I am grateful to Carol Graham for writing a commentary on this Article. Carol 
Graham, An Economist’s Perspective on Well-Being Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1691 (2013). Graham distinguishes between two types of SWB surveys: hedonic well-
being (HWB) surveys (which seek to measure individuals’ affects) and evaluative well-being 
(EWB) surveys (which seek to measure how individuals evaluate their lives). Id. at 1692–93. To 
be clear, my intention in this Article is not to defend HWB surveys as contrasted with EWB 
surveys. Part II focuses on life-satisfaction surveys (a kind of EWB survey) as a comparatively 
more plausible indicator of preference utility than happiness surveys—but my aim in 
undertaking the analysis of Part II is to demonstrate that the PR defense with respect to SWB 
surveys of any kind is problematic. (Because EWB surveys fail in that role, as Part II shows, 
then a fortiori HWB surveys do.) Part III, in discussing the weak EQ defense, focuses on 
Kahneman’s “objective happiness” framework. It does so because Kahneman’s work is the most 
fully developed version of the weak EQ defense. As it happens, “objective happiness” relies on 
HWB surveys (asking about momentary affects) rather than EWB surveys. I do not mean to 
suggest that the weak EQ approach is best fleshed out by focusing wholly on affects, and indeed 
I criticize Kahneman for doing just that. See infra Part III.B.5. 
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I.  PREFERENCES, EXPERIENCES, AND THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS 
Section A of this Part clarifies some important well-being 
concepts. A key distinction is that between experientialist and 
nonexperientialist conceptions of well-being. A preference-based 
conception of well-being falls in the nonexperientialist category 
because an individual can hold an intrinsic preference for items other 
than her own experiences. For example, she might prefer to be in 
good health, to have children, or to attain various goals she has set for 
herself, as such, rather than merely preferring the experiences that 
flow from health, children, or goal fulfillment. 
Section B looks at the empirical evidence regarding individuals’ 
intrinsic preferences for nonexperiential items. If such preferences 
were empirically rare, policy-analysis tools might safely ignore them. 
But the available evidence does not demonstrate that this is the case. 
Finally, building upon the conceptual tools set forth here, Section 
C differentiates between PR (preference-realization) and EQ 
(experience-quality) defenses of the policy role of SWB surveys. 
A. Well-Being, Happiness, Preference, Experience, and Utility: Some 
Clarifications 
In an article published in the prestigious Economic Journal, 
Richard Easterlin—who pioneered the use of SWB data in 
economics—writes, “Throughout this article, I use the terms 
happiness, subjective well-being, satisfaction, utility, well-being, and 
welfare interchangeably.”23 For anyone acquainted with the vibrant 
contemporary philosophical literature on welfare, Easterlin’s 
equivalences—and similar conflations drawn throughout the SWB 
literature24—are unsettling. Imagine how a labor or financial 
 
 23. Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, 111 ECON. J. 
465, 465 (2001). 
 24. See, e.g., DIENER ET AL., supra note 10, at 9–12 (suggesting that “economic theories of 
well-being equate well-being with utility,” that “economists define utility as the satisfaction that 
a person experiences from the consumption of goods,” and that the authors’ proposed 
subjective definition of well-being, in terms of individuals’ favorable self-evaluations, is 
“essentially identical to economists’ concept of utility”); FREY, supra note 1, at 3 (“In 
general, . . . as in the literature, the terms ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’, and ‘life satisfaction’ are used 
interchangeably.”); David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in 
Britain and the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1360–62 (2004) (using well-being, happiness, and 
utility as equivalent terms); Diener & Seligman, supra note 10, at 1 (defining “[w]ell-being” as 
“peoples’ positive evaluations of their lives”); Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic 
Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815, 1815 (1997) (leaping from the premise that economic 
ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  2:56 PM 
1522 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1509 
economist would react to the statement, “I use the terms income, 
consumption, and wealth interchangeably.” 
Academic philosophers writing about well-being standardly draw 
a series of distinctions that I will now articulate. Are these distinctions 
“right” or “true” or “correct” in some foundational sense? Maybe 
not. For purely predictive or explanatory purposes, it might be 
perfectly appropriate to equate “happiness, subjective well-being, 
satisfaction, utility, well-being, and welfare,” as Easterlin does.25 And 
asserting the “correctness,” for normative purposes, of a scheme that 
disaggregates well-being, happiness, preference satisfaction, and 
utility—a disaggregation commonplace in contemporary 
philosophical writing about welfare26—implicates contested 
metaethical questions that I am quite happy (!) to avoid here. 
I will observe, however, that academic philosophers—the 
scholarly community engaged in serious, longstanding, normative 
debates about well-being—have found it useful to deploy a certain 
vocabulary. This has served to make precise plausible normative 
views. And it seems pretty risky for SWB scholars, now also engaged 
in normative debates, to ignore the vocabulary or to dumb it down. 
First, philosophers typically recognize that there is a plurality of 
accounts of well-being. One such account sees an individual’s well-
being as based upon various objective goods. Another equates well-
being and preference attainment. A third account, the hedonic 
account, dating back to Jeremy Bentham, says that an individual’s 
 
performance has no intrinsic normative significance, to the conclusion that “[e]conomic things 
matter only in so far as they make people happier”); Carol D. Ryff & Burton H. Singer, Know 
Thyself and Become What You Are: A Eudaimonic Approach to Psychological Well-Being, 9 J. 
HAPPINESS STUD. 13, 14–15 (2008) (viewing Aristotelian “eudaimonia” as a kind of 
psychological state, namely “psychological well-being”); Bernard M.S. van Praag, Perspectives 
from the Happiness Literature and the Role of New Instruments for Policy Analysis, 53 CESIFO 
ECON. STUD. 42, 42 & n.1 (2007) (assuming that “economic behaviour . . . is motivated by 
maximization of utility, satisfaction, well-being or happiness” and noting that “[w]e will make 
no difference between these notions”). For further examples of SWB scholars using the 
concepts of well-being, subjective well-being, and/or happiness as equivalent, see Erik Angner, 
Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being ‘Direct’?, 89 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 115, 119–20 (2011). 
 25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 77–81 
(2012); DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE ELUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
WELL-BEING 29–42 (2008); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 81–98 (1996); 
Erik Angner, Subjective Well-Being, 39 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361, 362–63 (2010). 
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welfare depends upon her pains and pleasures. And there are further 
possibilities.27 
Choosing between these accounts is a matter for substantive 
normative argument. Purely semantical or definitional considerations 
will not suffice to vindicate one account. Sheer reflection on the 
meaning of the word “well-being” will not establish, for example, that 
a preference-based view of well-being is correct, and that those who 
espouse competing views are in error. Instead, the proponent of any 
particular account will need to bring into play the ordinary tools of 
normative debate: showing that this account has intuitively appealing 
results for particular cases, that it fits with more general principles 
that seem attractive, and so forth. 
Second, philosophers categorize the plurality of accounts of well-
being in various ways (with such categorization seen as illuminating 
normative debate). One such categorization is binary, demarcating 
between accounts that make an individual’s well-being wholly 
dependent upon the quality of her mental states, and accounts that do 
not have this feature. I will make this demarcation precise by 
distinguishing between experientialist and nonexperientialist accounts 
of welfare: 
Experientialist versus Nonexperientialist Accounts of 
Well-Being: A Definition 
An experientialist account of well-being satisfies the 
following requirement: if a given individual’s mental 
states (her beliefs, affects, memories, desires, and all 
other aspects of her mental states) in outcome x are 
identical to her mental states in outcome y, and 
outcomes x and y are maximally specified,28 then the 
 
 27. For an overview of the philosophical literature on well-being, see MATTHEW D. 
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 158–85 
(2012). 
 28. An “outcome” is a possible state of affairs: a description of some aspect of the world, 
which might possibly occur or have occurred in the past, present, and/or future. A maximally 
specified outcome is what philosophers term a “possible world,” namely an outcome F such that 
for every other F* either F entails F* or F entails not-F*. In effect, a maximally specified 
outcome is a complete history of the universe, leaving no possible occurrence undetermined. 
  Of course, maximally specified outcomes are not items that humans can hold in 
consciousness. In particular, human policy analysts cannot use maximally specified outcomes to 
think about policy impacts. Rather, maximally specified outcomes are theoretical constructs that 
serve various theoretical purposes. For example, they help to categorize different accounts of 
well-being. An experientialist account says that the quality of an individual’s experiences is the 
only intrinsic determinant of her well-being; changes in nonexperiential items can cause changes 
in well-being, but do not change it directly. This feature of experientialism is made precise by 
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individual is equally well-off in both outcomes. A 
nonexperientialist account is any account that fails to 
satisfy the experientialism requirement. (A 
nonexperientialist account says that it is possible for 
there to be an individual, i, and maximally specified 
outcomes x and y, such that i is better off in x than y 
even though all of the individual’s mental states are 
the same in the two outcomes.) 
A hedonic account of well-being is experientialist in the sense 
defined here. Assume that all aspects of a given individual’s mental 
states are identical in (maximally specified) outcomes x and y. Then, 
in particular, her pain sensations in x are identical to her pain 
sensations in y. And her pleasure sensations in x are identical to her 
pleasure sensations in y. If so, someone who adopts a hedonic 
conception of welfare will say that the individual is equally well-off in 
the two outcomes. 
The hedonic account is not the sole member of the class of 
experientialist views. A richer account, also experientialist, says that 
an individual’s well-being depends not only upon her pains and 
pleasures, but also upon her attainment of high quality nonhedonic 
mental states (for example, having good memories, cognitions, or 
perceptions) and her avoidance of low quality nonhedonic mental 
states.29 It is easy to see why this richer account is still experientialist 
as per the above definition. Assume that all aspects of an individual’s 
mental life are identical in (maximally specified) outcomes x and y: 
her pains and pleasures and her memories, cognitions, perceptions, 
 
the definition in the text only if x and y are maximally specified. Even an experientialist account 
might allow the welfare ranking of partially described outcomes to be a partial function of 
nonmental attributes (given their causal role).  
  For example, assume that outcomes are partially described to specify an individual’s 
income and how much pain or pleasure she feels, but not the nonhedonic aspects of her mental 
life (for example, her sense of life satisfaction or the quality of her memories). Assume that 
individual i’s pains and pleasures are the same in x and y, but that she has more income in x. 
Then someone who reduces well-being to pains/pleasures and a sense of life satisfaction—a kind 
of sophisticated experientialist account—might say that individual i is better off in x than y 
despite the fact that all of i’s specified mental attributes are identical in x and y. Having greater 
income might cause a change in unspecified, well-being-relevant mental attributes, namely, a 
sense of life satisfaction.  
  By contrast, if x and y are fully specified, the causal upshots of any nonmental attribute 
that an individual might possess are already “built into” the description of the outcomes, and so 
the only reason for a difference in some nonmental attribute to yield a difference in well-being 
is because of the attribute’s intrinsic welfare significance.  
 29. See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
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and so forth. Then, even on the account which says that well-being is 
a matter of attaining pleasure and high-quality nonhedonic states, and 
avoiding pain and low-quality nonhedonic states, the individual is 
equally well-off in the two outcomes. 
The concept of “happiness” is standardly (although perhaps not 
invariably) specified in experientialist terms.30 If an individual’s 
affects and cognitions and everything else about her mental life are 
identical in two outcomes, then it must be the case that she is equally 
happy in both. Happiness (however more precisely defined) is “in the 
head”—at least on the standard view. 
It thus follows that “well-being” and “happiness” are distinct 
concepts. There is nothing conceptually incoherent in acknowledging 
that happiness satisfies the experientialism requirement, while 
simultaneously adopting a nonexperientialist account of welfare, 
which says that well-being does not satisfy this requirement. Again, 
nonexperientialism about well-being might be substantively 
unattractive—it might lose out after normative debate—but such an 
account is in no way confused or incoherent regarding the very 
meaning of “well-being.” 
What, then, are important examples of nonexperientialist 
accounts of welfare? “Objective good” accounts posit a plurality of 
well-being goods that include but are not limited to good mental 
states, and that are seen as having some basis other than an 
individual’s preferences. Such accounts are nonexperientialist. 
Consider, for example, Martha Nussbaum’s well-known list of human 
“capabilities,” a modern exemplar of the objective-good approach.31 
The list includes: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; the senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other 
species; play; and control over one’s environment. Note that a few of 
these items individually satisfy the experientialism requirement, but 
that others do not (and thus the overall account does not either). 
Contrast, for example, emotions and body health. 
It is straightforward that an objective-good account of welfare 
falls within the category of nonexperientialist accounts. A more subtle 
point—and one absolutely central to this Article—is that preference-
 
 30. See HAYBRON, supra note 26, at 30. 
 31. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 78–80 (2000); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? 
Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S81 (2008) (critically evaluating 
proposals to orient policy around SWB). 
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based accounts are also nonexperientialist. A preference-based 
account ascribes to a given individual i a ranking Ri of outcomes. 
Depending on the account, Ri might be i’s actual preferences, or Ri 
might be “laundered” in various ways. In either event, what makes Ri 
a “preference” ranking is (1) that Ri is minimally well-behaved (in 
particular, it is transitive), and (2) that Ri is connected to individual i’s 
choices. The preference-based view then says that one outcome is 
better than a second outcome for individual i if and only if the first 
outcome is ranked higher by Ri. 
The “arguments” for an individual’s preference ranking are the 
features of outcomes that move them up or down in the ranking. We 
can further distinguish between an individual’s intrinsic preferences 
and her instrumental preferences. I intrinsically prefer something if I 
want it for its own sake; I instrumentally prefer something if I want it 
because I believe it helps me advance my intrinsic preferences. For 
example, I might have an intrinsic goal to sail around the world, and 
want to be healthy not because I care about health as such, but 
because being healthy will enable me to fulfill this goal. I will use the 
term “fundamental argument” to mean the features of outcomes that 
an individual intrinsically prefers. 
And now we can see why a preference-based account of well-
being does not satisfy the experientialism requirement. On such a 
view, it is quite possible that the fundamental arguments for 
individual i’s preferences include features of outcomes other than 
individual i’s mental states. If so, individual i can be better off in one 
(maximally specified) outcome than in a second even though his 
mental states are identical in the two outcomes. 
Understand that my intention is simply to explain what a 
preference-based view of well-being involves. I am not arguing, here, 
in favor of such a view, as opposed to a hedonic account or some 
other account within the experientialist family.32 My aim, at this 
 
 32. I have elsewhere endorsed a preference-based view of well-being. See MATTHEW D. 
ADLER & ERIC. A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25–61 (2006); 
ADLER, supra note 27, at 155–231. And the discussion in Part III.C—suggesting a methodology 
for incorporating information about experiential quality into policy—does presuppose that a 
preference-based view is more attractive than competing views. However, the remainder of the 
Article does not commit itself to this view. The nature of well-being is contested, and this Article 
hopes to address a wider readership than persuaded preferentialists. The aim of this Part is 
clarificatory: to bring to light distinctions between the various well-being accounts that are often 
obscured in the SWB literature. Part II argues that a potential defense of SWB surveys, in light 
of a preference-based view (the PR defense), is unpersuasive. This is an argument about the 
relation between the preference-based view and SWB surveys—not a defense of that view. Part 
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juncture, is simply to articulate the demarcation set forth by the 
experientialism requirement and to clarify that preference-based 
views fall on the nonexperientialist side of that demarcation. 
The point can be further clarified by introducing the concept of a 
utility function. A utility function, in traditional economics, is a real-
valued mathematical function ui(.), which represents the preference 
ranking Ri of individual i.
33 Under standard technical conditions, Ri 
will be thus representable, so that outcome x is ranked higher by Ri 
than outcome y if and only if ui(x) > ui(y). 
If outcomes are maximally specified, the fundamental arguments 
for an individual’s preferences are the entries in her utility function. 
Let us assume for the moment—simply to facilitate the exposition—
that outcomes are maximally specified. We can now see very easily 
why a preference-based view is not experientialist. Why? It is possible 
that i’s utility function takes the form ui(Mi, Ni) where Mi denotes 
facts about i’s mental states (her pains and pleasures, memories, 
cognitions, and so forth), and Ni are other facts about individual i or 
the wider world. If two outcomes are identical with respect to the Mi 
facts but not with respect to the Ni facts, individual i’s utility function 
may assign a different number to the two outcomes. This will indicate 
that the outcomes are not ranked equally by Ri; and a preference-
based view will then say that the individual is not equally well-off in 
the outcomes, thus violating the experientialism requirement. 
In actual practice, economists and policy analysts do not work 
with maximally specified outcomes (which are cognitively 
intractable). The analytical nexus between the fundamental 
arguments for an individual’s preferences (the items she intrinsically 
prefers or disprefers) and the entries in her utility function becomes 
more complex. Where outcomes are not maximally specified, a utility 
function of the form ui(Mi, Ni) or ui(Ni)—where Ni are nonmental 
facts—might just mean that i has an instrumental preference 
regarding those facts. The individual prefers various nonmental 
occurrences because they will cause her to have various experiences. 
It is also possible, however, that i has an intrinsic preference 
regarding nonmental features of the world and that a utility function 
of the form ui(Mi, Ni) or ui(Ni) is capturing this intrinsic preference. 
 
III.A criticizes experientialism about well-being—but note that “objective good” as well as 
preference-based views reject experientialism. 
 33. See HAUSMAN, supra note 26, at 13–14; ANDREU MAS-COLLEL, MICHAEL D. 
WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 6–9, 46–50 (7th prtg. 2009). 
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One objection, pressed by readers of early drafts of this Article, 
is that it does not “make sense” for preferences to have non-mental-
state fundamental arguments. In traditional consumer theory, the 
inputs to an individual’s utility function are the physical quantities of 
various kinds of goods that an individual possesses and consumes 
(physically interacts with). Now, it might be objected that an intrinsic 
preference to possess and consume various goods embodies an 
irrational consumption fetishism. Someone might plausibly have an 
instrumental preference to consume bundle C rather than C*, 
believing that consuming the first bundle will cause her to experience 
more happiness than consuming the second. But to prefer bundle C as 
such—independent of any belief that having C will lead to different 
experiences than C*—seems unintelligible.34 
To think carefully about this objection, we should have in view 
the different kinds of preference-based accounts, that is, the different 
ways in which preferences might be “laundered.”35 One kind of view 
requires simply that preferences satisfy formal rationality conditions 
(either the minimum requirements constitutive of a preference, or 
additional requirements). But formal rationality conditions clearly 
permit preferences with non-mental-state fundamental arguments. 
For example, someone might well have a transitive, complete, 
continuous, convex, monotonic, and otherwise formally well-behaved 
ranking of consumption bundles.36 
A more fully “laundered” account requires that preferences be 
“intelligible”: that they “make sense,” rather than merely satisfy 
formal rationality conditions. Although intrinsic preferences for 
consumption bundles, or for income, may well fail this requirement, 
there are various other kinds of intrinsic preferences for nonmental 
items that seem perfectly intelligible.37 (1) Health. Health economists 
typically include an individual’s health (meaning not merely her 
 
 34. Amartya Sen famously argues for a closely related proposition, namely that social 
assessment should focus on the achieved “functionings” that are caused by income together with 
individuals’ physical and social attributes, or opportunities to function, and not income itself. 
E.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 28–30 (1992); see also Amartya Sen, 
Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 41 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen 
eds., 1993) (“Since income is not desired for its own sake, any income-based notion of poverty 
must refer—directly or indirectly—to those basic ends which are produced by income as 
means.”). 
 35. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 170–72. 
 36. See MAS-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 41–50. 
 37. See Dan Moller, Wealth, Disability, and Happiness, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 177, 186–89 
(2011). 
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mental health, but also the physical integrity and functioning of her 
body) as one of the entries in her utility function.38 Although this 
functional structure could merely be capturing an instrumental 
preference for health, an intrinsic desire to be healthy also seems 
intelligible—no less so than an intrinsic preference for certain affects, 
cognitions, or memories.39 Jim desires not to feel pain; Jane desires 
not to have a limb amputated (independent of whatever pain limb 
loss causes). Where is the argument that Jim’s desires make sense but 
Jane’s desires do not? (2) Liberty. Having more liberties may reduce 
the quality of someone’s experiences.40 For example, more liberties 
might cause more frustration at unrealized expectations, or more time 
spent agonizing over choices.41 Still, an individual might view liberty 
as an aspect of personhood; she might intrinsically prefer to increase 
her liberties “because that’s what autonomy means,” even 
recognizing the uncertain or negative experiential impact of this 
increase. (3) Goal fulfillment. Individuals, as they grow to adulthood, 
develop a wide range of life goals: to have a particular kind of career; 
to develop mastery of a particular sport, musical instrument, or art 
form; to travel to certain places; to learn some body of knowledge; to 
make an impact on the community in a certain way; and so forth. 
Surely someone can intelligibly defend her preference for fulfilling 
some particular life goal by saying, “This is just what I’ve always 
wanted to do, and have worked for years to accomplish.” And, if that 
were not enough, she could add, “What is it to be an autonomous 
person, but to develop and pursue life goals?” It would be astonishing 
 
 38. See Béatrice Rey & Jean-Charles Rochet, Health and Wealth: How Do They Affect 
Individual Preferences?, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 43, 44–46 (2004). 
 39. For a review of evidence that individuals have an intrinsic preference for health, see 
infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text; see also Carol Graham, Happiness and Health: 
Lessons—and Questions—for Public Policy, 27 HEALTH AFF. 72, 73–74 (2008) (reviewing 
evidence showing imperfect correlation between health and happiness); Carol Graham, Lucas 
Higuera & Eduardo Lora, Which Health Conditions Cause the Most Unhappiness?, 20 HEALTH 
ECON. 1431, 1432–33 (2011) (same); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering 
Awards: They Shouldn’t Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195 (2008) 
(arguing for the intelligibility of an intrinsic preference not to be physically injured). 
 40. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness, 1 
AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 190, 191 (2009) (finding declining female happiness during a period 
of increased labor market opportunities and other options for women).  
 41. See Carol Graham & Stefano Pettinato, Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers and 
Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies, J. DEV. STUD., Apr. 2002, at 100, 117–20 
(providing evidence of “frustrated achievers”: upward income mobility shifts income 
expectations and reduces happiness). See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF 
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004). 
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if the only sensible explanation for why someone might want to 
master cello, to become an airplane pilot, or to climb Mount Everest 
were because of what those accomplishments would make her feel, 
think, or remember. (4) Knowledge. Personhood involves both 
“practical rationality” (the capacity to form and act upon goals) and 
“theoretical rationality” (the capacity to acquire knowledge).42 
Aristotle thought that the exercise of theoretical rationality was the 
highest form of human well-being.43 Whether or not this is true, it is 
certainly intelligible to have an intrinsic preference for knowledge, a 
preference to believe true propositions. But note that the degree to 
which someone possesses knowledge is not a wholly experiential fact 
about her. It depends both upon what she believes, and whether what 
she believes is true, that is, whether it corresponds to facts in the 
world.44 (5) Relationships. Just as someone might intelligibly see her 
status as a human being as the basis for an intrinsic preference for 
physical health; and her status as an autonomous person as the basis 
for an intrinsic preference to possess various liberties, to develop and 
fulfill various life-goals, or to possess knowledge; so, too, someone 
might see her status as a social animal as justifying intrinsic 
preferences for having friendships, for being a parent, or for having 
other kinds of relationships. In fact, the existing evidence from SWB 
surveys does not establish that parenthood increases SWB.45 If 
someone believes that being a parent will, on balance, produce some 
decrease in his happiness and feelings of satisfaction, but still prefers 
to be a parent, is his preference necessarily unintelligible? 
Robert Nozick’s famous discussion of the “experience machine” 
is relevant, here: 
 
 42. THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 38–41 (1993); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59–80 (1980) (arguing for the intrinsic value of knowledge); George 
Loewenstein, That Which Makes Life Worthwhile, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-
BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4, at 87, 96–97 (same). 
 43. Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 
29, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics. 
 44. Moreover, knowledge may not produce happiness or life satisfaction. For evidence that 
SWB need not increase with education, see Dolan et al., supra note 1, at 99–100; and Joop 
Hartog & Hessel Oosterbeek, Health, Wealth and Happiness: Why Pursue a Higher Education?, 
17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 245, 251–54 (1998). 
 45. See Dolan et al., supra note 1, at 107 (finding mixed evidence of SWB impact of having 
children); Thomas Hansen, Parenthood and Happiness: A Review of Folk Theories Versus 
Empirical Evidence, 108 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 29, 44 (2012) (finding that resident children 
tend to reduce SWB). 
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Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were 
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting 
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes 
attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, 
preprogramming your life’s experiences? If you are worried about 
missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that business 
enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. 
You can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of 
such experiences . . . . Would you plug in?46 
My intrinsic preference for some nonmental state of affairs is a 
preference that this state of affairs actually occur and not merely a 
preference that I believe (perhaps falsely) in such occurrence and 
have the feelings caused by this belief (perhaps false). If Tim 
intrinsically prefers to be in good health, then what Tim wants is 
actually to be free of diseases, not merely to believe that he is disease-
free. If Sarah intrinsically prefers to have a loving and faithful spouse, 
then what Sarah prefers is a spouse who actually loves her, not merely 
one who succeeds in persuading her that he does (but cheats behind 
her back). If Emily wants to be an airline pilot, then what she prefers 
is a complex state of affairs including her own physical movements 
(that she actually move through the air by piloting an aircraft) and 
social recognition (that she be recognized by others as a pilot), and 
not merely that she believe all this. What Nozick’s “experience 
machine” underscores is that some such preferences are perfectly 
intelligible. 
More specifically, what seems intelligible is a preference 
structure with both nonmental and mental fundamental arguments. In 
wanting a good marriage, what I want is (1) a certain kind of 
relationship (including my spouse actually loving me, being faithful, 
and so forth, as opposed to my being deceived on this score), and (2) 
being aware of, and made happy by, this relationship.47 A preference 
just to have a certain kind of relationship—wholly independent of 
how happy or miserable it makes me feel—does seem quite odd. In 
general, it does seem quite odd for someone to be wholly indifferent 
 
 46. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42–43 (1974). 
 47. Cf. SUMNER, supra note 26, at 139 (analyzing well-being as “authentic happiness,” 
where authenticity requires inter alia that the individual be factually well-informed); Shelly 
Kagan, Well-Being as Enjoying the Good, 23 PHIL. PERSP. 253, 255 (2009) (suggesting that well-
being may consist of taking pleasure in the attainment of objective goods). 
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to her own happiness, pains and pleasures, memories, cognitions, or 
other mental states. But that is not the issue here. Rather, I am trying 
to show how a preference-based view of well-being violates the 
experientialism requirement. It is intelligible to have preferences with 
hybrid fundamental arguments: for some person to care intrinsically 
that (1) certain nonmental facts occur, and (2) that she have certain 
beliefs, memories, cognitions, or feelings as a result of those non-
mental facts. 
The ranking of outcomes in light of such hybrid preferences does 
not satisfy the experientialism requirement because the preferences 
have nonmental as well as mental fundamental arguments. And an 
intelligibility constraint on preferences—at a minimum—will surely 
allow some such hybrid preferences. It follows that a preference-
based view of well-being—even if it incorporates an intelligibility 
constraint—is nonexperientialist. 
Yet a different kind of laundering requires fully informed 
preferences. But there is no reason to think that fully informed 
preferences must satisfy the experientialism requirement any more 
than to think that intelligible preferences must. 
So much for the objection that properly laundered preferences 
(preferences that are formally rational, intelligible, and/or fully 
informed) must satisfy the experientialism requirement. A second 
objection to my characterization of preference-based accounts of 
well-being as nonexperientialist might be articulated as follows: 
“Someone’s preferences are relevant to her well-being only if those 
preferences are self-interested. And a self-interest constraint, properly 
understood, does require that preferences satisfy the experientialism 
requirement.” I will postpone discussion of this objection until later in 
the Article.48 To anticipate that discussion: although an experientialist 
conception of “self-interested” has some plausibility, I believe that 
the preferentialist should reject it. This conception is 
counterintuitively narrow, and lacks a theoretical warrant, except on 
a controversial view about personal identity. 
In sum, an individual’s preferences—even her laundered, self-
interested preferences—can have nonmental fundamental arguments. 
And thus preference-based accounts of well-being, like objective-
good accounts—and unlike accounts that reduce well-being to 
pains/pleasures, to happiness, or to richer packages of affects, 
 
 48. See infra Part III.A. 
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cognitions, memories, perceptions, and/or other types of mental 
states—constitute nonexperientialist conceptions of human welfare. 
Some readers might remain puzzled by my characterization of 
preference-based views as nonexperientialist. These readers might 
think: “A preference is itself a kind of mental state. If individual i’s 
well-being depends upon his preferences, then his well-being depends 
upon his mental states. So how can a preference-based account of 
well-being be nonexperientialist?” 
Of course, someone’s preferences are one aspect of her mental 
states. It would be absurd to say otherwise. However, preference-
based views are nonexperientialist in the specific sense expressed by 
the experientialism requirement. That requirement is framed to 
capture an important feature of well-being accounts, one that is 
highly relevant to normative debates about them. If an account fails 
the experientialism requirement, then it is possible to directly change 
someone’s well-being without changing any of his mental states. And 
indeed this is true of preference-based accounts. Imagine that 
individual i has the very same preferences, Ri, in (maximally 
specified) outcomes x and y; that Ri has nonmental fundamental 
arguments Ni as well as mental fundamental arguments Mi; that the 
individual’s mental states are identical in the two outcomes (not just 
his preferences, but his pains and pleasures, cognitions, memories, 
and everything else about his mental states); but that outcome x is 
ranked by Ri above outcome y because the Ni facts are different. Then 
this is a case where i prefers x to y, and is better off in x than in y 
according to a preference-based view, even though everything about 
his mental states in the two outcomes (including his preferences) are 
identical.49 
 
 49. A different objection is that any person j whose preferences have non-mental-state 
fundamental arguments can be mimicked by a “doppelganger” j* who cares only about her 
mental states. In particular, whenever j intrinsically prefers nonmental fact F, j* has an intrinsic 
preference concerning her beliefs; namely, j* prefers that she believe F. Thus, policy modelers 
can ignore the possibility of preferences with non-mental-state fundamental arguments—instead 
“translating” apparent intrinsic preferences for nonexperiential items into intrinsic preferences 
for the corresponding beliefs. 
  But one implication of Nozick’s “experience machine” example is that j and j* will not 
necessarily make identical choices. If the machine will cause the false belief F, then j* might 
enter the machine while j refuses. Moreover, third parties might act very differently toward j 
and j*. If j prefers to have a faithful spouse, and a friend observes that j’s spouse is unfaithful, 
then the friend might tell j but not do the same in j*’s case. If j wants to be in good physical 
health, the government might fund certain health interventions that it would not fund in the 
case of j*, who simply wants to believe she is in good health. 
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To say that someone’s preferences can have non-mental-state 
fundamental arguments is not to say that they must. There is nothing 
in the preference-based account of welfare to require that someone 
intrinsically care about items other than her own mental states. But, 
conversely, the view does not prohibit her from doing so. What 
someone prefers, and thus what improves her well-being, is for her to 
determine. On a preference-based account of welfare, it is possible for 
someone—possible, if she has an intrinsic preference for health, 
liberty, goal fulfillment, knowledge, relationships, or other nonmental 
features of outcomes—to be directly benefited or harmed without any 
change in her mental states, by virtue of events that change the Ni 
facts but not the Mi facts. 
Unfortunately, this feature of preference-based views is not 
always well-understood by researchers in the SWB literature. One 
tendency in this literature is to adopt an experientialist account of 
well-being without substantive normative argument. This tendency 
assumes, from the get-go, that well-being is solely a matter of 
attaining high quality mental states and avoiding low quality ones, 
whether specified as pain/pleasure, happiness/unhappiness, feelings of 
satisfaction, or in some other way.50 
In particular, SWB scholars too often assume that individuals’ 
intrinsic preferences must be for mental items.51 But to do this is to 
misunderstand the antipaternalism that constitutes an attraction of 
the preference-based account. For the preferentialist, the extent to 
which an individual’s welfare covaries with her experiences, as 
opposed to covarying with nonexperiential facts about her (or the 
wider world), is an empirical question—one to be resolved not by 
scholarly stipulation or assumption, but only by looking to what the 
individual prefers. 
A related confusion concerns the meaning of “utility.” As 
already explained, a preference is a ranking, and a utility function a 
mathematical device for representing that ranking. Again, utility 
function ui(.) represents individual i’s preferences, Ri, if the following 
 
 50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., FREY, supra note 1, at 5 (“[H]appiness is undoubtedly an overriding goal in 
most people’s lives.”); LAYARD, supra note 10, at 124 (arguing that happiness-maximization 
“values what people want for themselves, for their children and for their fellow citizens,” 
namely “their happiness”); Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball & Alex Rees-
Jones, What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would 
Choose?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2083, 2107 (2012) (noting that the implicit view in much of the 
economics of happiness literature is that SWB is the sole argument for idealized preferences).  
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is true: whenever outcome x is ranked above outcome y by Ri, ui(x) > 
ui(y). 
An individual’s utility, in this sense, can change without any 
change in an individual’s feelings, beliefs, or perceptions. If ui(.) 
includes nonmental states as its entries, taking the form ui(Mi, Ni) or 
ui(Ni), with Ni nonmental features of individual i or the wider world, 
then individual i can have higher or lower utility in one outcome than 
in a second outcome even though her beliefs, feelings, enjoyments, 
and so forth, are exactly the same in both. 
In particular, individual i’s actual utility—the numerical value 
that ui(.) attaches to the actual outcome—can be higher or lower than 
her utility in some counterfactual outcome without individual i being 
aware of this. If Ri ranks x over y, and outcome x occurs, it does not 
follow that individual i realizes that an outcome preferred to y has 
occurred or realizes that her utility level is higher in the actual 
outcome than if y had occurred. Think of Ri as an individualized 
criterion for assessing and comparing different possible (more or less 
completely specified) histories of the world. In general, i will not be 
infallible about the extent to which the actual world matches up to 
this criterion. 
This is most clearly true if Ri has nonmental fundamental 
arguments. Imagine that I prefer to be liked by my peers. In a world y 
where they laugh behind my back, without my realizing it, I am lower 
in the Ri ranking than in an otherwise identical world x where I am 
genuinely liked, and my utility ui(y) is lower than utility ui(x); but if y 
were to occur, I would not perceive that my utility is lower than ui(x). 
Indeed, as discussed in the margin, even if the fundamental 
arguments for Ri are just mental states, individual i will not generally 
be infallible about his utility level; his beliefs and feelings about his 
utility need not correspond to his actual utility level.52 
 
 52. This can occur insofar as individuals incorrectly predict the causal impact of nonmental 
attributes. Imagine that individual i cares only about his pains and pleasures. If x and y are 
(incompletely specified) outcomes that describe individuals’ income, health, and various other 
nonhedonic attributes, then it could be the case that ui(x) > ui(y), because i will end up with 
more pleasure in x, but that i incorrectly believes his bundle of nonhedonic attributes in y will 
cause him more pleasure. (This is just a kind of hedonic forecasting error.) In particular, an 
individual who cares only about pains and pleasures might give an incorrect answer to a 
question (such as the following) asking him to compare his preference-utility in the actual world 
x to what his utility would be in y, given the counterfactual bundle of nonhedonic attributes 
specified in y. “Consider your actual income and health. Is your preference-utility higher than it 
would be if, instead, you had this level of health and this much income?” 
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Economists and philosophers sometimes use the term 
“satisfaction” with reference to a preference structure.53 Outcome x 
better “satisfies” individual i’s preferences than y if x is ranked above 
y by Ri. “Satisfaction,” in this sense, does not necessarily have an 
experiential component: Joe’s preferences can be more fully satisfied 
without Joe feeling more satisfied (for just the reasons discussed in 
the previous two paragraphs). Of course, in ordinary English, the 
word “satisfy” does have affective connotations, and so instead I will 
use the term “realization” or “attainment” to mean movement up a 
preference ranking. Preference-based accounts of well-being reduce 
the well-being ranking of outcomes, for some person, to the 
realization of that person’s preferences—not to the feelings of 
satisfaction experienced by that person. 
The SWB literature regularly blurs the line between preference-
realization (on the one hand) and feelings of satisfaction or beliefs 
regarding preference-realization (on the other), and the related point 
that individuals can have intrinsic preferences for items other than 
their own mental states. For example, Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, 
Ulrich Schimmack, and John Helliwell analyze well-being in terms of 
individuals’ beliefs and self-evaluations: “A life is going well only if 
the individual who lives this life endorses it as good and evaluates it 
positively.”54 They then explain: 
  Our definition of well-being . . . is clearly a subjective one. People 
have well-being only when they believe that their life is going well, 
regardless of whether that life has pleasure, material comforts, a 
sense of meaning, or any other objective feature that has been 
specified as essential for well-being. . . . 
  We should note in this context that our subjective definition of 
well-being is essentially identical to economists’ concept of 
utility. . . . [E]conomists define utility as the satisfaction that a 
person experiences from the consumption of goods.55 
Actually, the proposed account of well-being is not “essentially 
identical to economists’ concept of utility.” Economists, traditionally, 
do not define “utility” as “the satisfaction that a person experiences 
from the consumption of goods,” but rather as a numerical function 
representing the extent to which Ri is realized (whatever its 
 
 53. On what it means to “satisfy” preferences, see generally HAUSMAN, supra note 26. 
 54. DIENER ET AL., supra note 10, at 11 (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).  
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arguments, be they physical bundles of commodities, health, leisure, 
or happiness). We increase an individual’s utility, in the economic 
sense, by acting to produce those features of the world that she 
prefers; utility goes up when this happens. What she experiences or 
believes as a consequence is a separate question. 
One of the great virtues of Kahneman’s work on SWB has been 
his consistent attempts to keep in focus the difference between utility 
(in the traditional economist’s sense) and good experiences. 
Kahneman highlights this difference by using the terms “decision 
utility” and “experienced utility.” For example, Paul Dolan and 
Kahneman write: 
The word ‘utility’ has two distinct meanings: it can refer either to the 
hedonic experience of an outcome or to the preference or desire for 
that outcome. These have been labelled experienced utility and 
decision utility, respectively. Jeremy Bentham first defined utility in 
hedonic terms, as a measure of pleasure and pain, and economists 
followed that usage until the twentieth century. . . . 
  Economists abandoned experienced utility early in the twentieth 
century, in favour of a new interpretation, in which utility represents 
‘wantability.’ A person’s decision utilities are revealed by her 
choices. . . . Neoclassical welfare economics rests on a concept of 
decision utility that is cleansed of any reference to hedonic 
experience . . . .56 
However, the term “decision utility” as a measure of preference 
realization is somewhat problematic. It suggests, misleadingly, that a 
ranking of choices (decisions) is primary, when in fact the standard 
formal apparatus—expected-utility theory—makes someone’s 
ranking of choices derivative from her ranking of outcomes, plus 
probabilities. Moreover, although prior generations of economists 
(impressed by the observability of preferences for choices) did favor 
the use of choice data to infer preferences for outcomes, many 
economists now happily do so via surveys (“stated preference” 
formats).57 
Instead, modifying half of Kahneman’s terminology, I will 
distinguish between preference utility and experience utility. An 
individual’s preference utility is a number assigned to outcomes (or 
 
 56. Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for 
the Valuation of Health, 118 ECON. J. 215, 215 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 57. For a discussion of both the stated-preference methodology and the traditional view 
favoring behavioral evidence of preferences, see sources cited infra notes 119, 121. 
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other items, for example, choices) representing her ranking of 
outcomes (or her ranking of those other items). An individual’s 
experience utility is a number assigned to outcomes (or other items58) 
measuring the quality of her experience. 
B. Do Individuals Prefer More Than Good Experiences? 
If preferences with nonmental fundamental arguments were 
empirically rare, policy analysis might be simplified by ignoring them. 
Policy models and tools might be structured on the premise that 
individuals intrinsically care only about their own experiences—with 
the justification that this simplifies the methodologies without too 
much loss in accuracy. But there is not clear evidence that individuals 
generally lack an intrinsic preference for health, liberty, goal 
fulfillment, consumption, relationships, knowledge, or other items 
that are (at least partly) nonexperiential. Absent such clear evidence, 
the preferentialist about well-being should endorse policy tools that 
leave open the possibility of preferences with nonmental fundamental 
arguments. 
The relative importance of experiential and nonexperiential 
arguments in individuals’ preference rankings is, in fact, a topic that 
scholars have not systematically investigated. To be sure, the SWB 
literature has documented, in great detail, the various ways in which 
individuals fail to maximize their own happiness. However, such 
findings—without more—do not do much to illuminate the structure 
of individual preferences. For example, the fact that someone chooses 
to procreate even though the average parent is no happier than the 
average childless adult is consistent both with the hypothesis that she 
has an intrinsic preference for parenting, and with the hypothesis that 
she has an intrinsic preference only for happiness plus mistaken 
beliefs about the hedonic benefits of parenting.59 Similarly, someone’s 
decision to pursue a higher education even though education appears 
to have little hedonic benefit might be motivated by an intrinsic 
preference for knowledge, or by a misunderstanding about how 
happy the better educated are.60 
In order to determine whether an individual intrinsically prefers 
some nonexperiential feature of outcomes, we need to specify the 
experiential consequences of different alternatives presented to the 
 
 58. For example, Kahneman assigns experience utility to moments. See infra Part III.B. 
 59. See supra note 45 (describing evidence of SWB impact of parenting). 
 60. See supra note 44 (describing evidence of SWB impact of education). 
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individual (or estimate her beliefs concerning those upshots), and 
then see what her ranking of the alternatives is. Only a few studies 
have attempted to do this, and their findings are mixed. 
Laura King and Christie Napa tested for the relative strength of 
individual preferences for happiness and a sense of meaning (types of 
experiences), as opposed to income, by showing respondents an 
ostensible “career survey,” which respondents believed to be a 
questionnaire filled out by a subject describing her job.61 In these 
questionnaires, the subject characterized her income as relatively high 
(>$100,000) or low ($21,000 to $30,000), and also answered questions 
about how happy she was in her job and how meaningful she found 
the job. Respondents were then asked to rate the desirability of the 
subject’s life—specifically, via three questions, one of which asked, 
“How much would you like to have this person’s life?” on a scale 
from 1 to 5, with the other two asking about the quality of the 
subject’s life and the extent to which she was living “the good life.” 
King and Napa found that the subject’s happiness and sense of 
meaning were much more significant than her income in driving 
respondents’ desirability ratings.62 However, the relative importance 
of happiness and sense of meaning, as opposed to nonincome items, 
was not examined. 
In preliminary, unpublished work, Paul Dolan and I presented 
respondents with different hypothetical lives—characterized in terms 
of the subject’s income, life expectancy, health, and happiness 
(specifically, what proportion of the time the subject was in a good 
mood)—and asked respondents to identify their most preferred life, 
their second choice, and so forth. We found the subject’s health, and 
then happiness, to be the most significant features in explaining 
respondents’ preferences over the hypothetical lives.63 
Daniel Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles Kimball, and Alex Rees-
Jones studied preferences for SWB by administering a survey that 
posed a series of binary, hypothetical choices.64 (For example, one 
choice was between a job paying $80,000/year with reasonable hours, 
permitting seven-and-a-half hours sleep each night, and a job paying 
 
 61. Laura A. King & Christie K. Napa, What Makes a Life Good?, 75 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 158 (1998).  
 62. Id. at 158–61. 
 63. Matthew Adler & Paul Dolan, Introducing a “Different Lives” Approach to the 
Valuation of Health and Well-Being 12 (Kenan Inst. for Ethics at Duke Univ., Working Paper 
No. 5, 2012). 
 64. Benjamin et al., supra note 51, at 2087.  
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$140,000 year allowing only six hours of nightly rest.)65 Their clever 
research strategy was to ask respondents, first, which choice would 
maximize SWB (either happiness or life satisfaction, depending on 
the sample, via a question such as, “Between these two options, 
taking all things together, which do you think would give you a 
happier life as a whole?”) and, second, which option they would 
choose.66 Divergent answers to the two questions by a given 
respondent show that she cares about something other than her 
predicted happiness/life satisfaction. Finally, a subsample of 
respondents were asked to identify the better option in light of 
various factors other than the respondent’s happiness/life 
satisfaction—specifically, her family’s happiness, her health, romantic 
life, social life, control over her life, spirituality, social status, fun, her 
life’s “nonboringness,” physical comfort, and sense of purpose.67  
The authors found that, on average “SWB and choice coincide 83 
percent of the time in our data,”68 but that the strength of this 
relationship varied substantially depending on choice situation, 
subject population and questionnaire design. Moreover, in a 
regression analysis, respondent-predicted SWB was by far the 
strongest predictor of choice, but “sense of purpose, control over life, 
family happiness, and social status” also had some role.69 
An earlier, much smaller study comparing hypothetical choice 
with predictions of happiness—by Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin—
found a larger deviation between the two than the Benjamin et al. 
study.70 
In a second study, Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones 
were able to compare actual choice with anticipated SWB.71 They 
asked medical students who had just submitted their rankings for the 
National Resident Matching Program to assign a level of anticipated 
SWB to each of their top four chosen residencies (both SWB during 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2087–88. 
 67. Id. at 2097. 
 68. Id. at 2085. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Amos Tversky & Dale Griffin, Endowments and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being, 
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 709, 722–23 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000). 
 71. Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball & Alex Rees-Jones, Can Marginal 
Rates of Substitution Be Inferred from Happiness Data? Evidence from Residency Choices 9–15, 
31 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, No. 8-2013, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2221538. 
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the residency itself, and over the remainder of their lives). The 
students were also asked to characterize each of the top four choices 
in terms of a number of attributes, such as the residency’s prestige, 
locational desirability, how stressful it would be, its career value, and 
its desirability to the student’s significant other (if any). The authors 
used statistical techniques to measure the tradeoffs between the 
attributes, first in terms of choice (how the students ranked 
programs) and second in terms of anticipated SWB, and found 
significant differences. If the students were ranking residencies to 
maximize anticipated SWB, no such differences should have been 
observed. 
In a recent large-scale survey, Paul Dolan and Robert Metcalfe 
asked individuals which of eight specific life domains “matters most in 
your life.”72 Notably, the domains included “Mental wellbeing.” A 
large plurality (42 percent) of respondents identified “Personal 
relationships” as the most important domain, and “Physical health” 
was also thus identified by a substantially larger percentage (18 
percent) than singled out “Mental wellbeing” (7 percent).73  
Other bodies of research do not directly address the strength of 
individuals’ preferences for nonexperiential items but still have some 
probative weight on this issue. First, by contrast with the Dolan and 
Metcalfe survey, some surveys pose an open-ended question about the 
most significant life domains—asking the respondent to list whichever 
aspects of his life he cares most about or sees as most important. 
Often, respondents include domains characterized in nonexperiential 
terms. For example, a large-scale survey asked British citizens to list 
the “most important areas of their life” and to place them in priority 
order.74 The largest fraction of respondents described relationships 
with friends or family as the single most important area of their lives, 
followed by “finances/standard-of-living/housing,” and then the 
respondent’s health.75 
 
 72. DOLAN & METCALFE, supra note 18, at 11, 20; see also Ed Diener & Christie Scollon, 
Subjective Well-Being Is Desirable, but Not the Summum Bonum 8–9, 20 (July 2, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (asking college students in 
various countries to rate happiness compared to other values such as wealth, love, health, and so 
forth). 
 73. DOLAN & METCALFE, supra note 18, at 5, 20 tbl.10. 
 74. Ann Bowling & Joy Windsor, Towards the Good Life: A Population Survey of 
Dimensions of Quality of Life, 2 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 55, 61 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 59, 61, 64. 
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It is possible that someone who uses nonexperiential language to 
describe his most important domain actually cares only about his 
experiences. For example, if I say that friendship is utmost, I might 
mean to say that (1) feeling satisfied by my friendships is utmost. Or, 
I might be saying that (2) feeling happy is utmost, and I believe that 
having friends is the surest route to my own happiness. But it seems 
more plausible that someone who cared mainly about the quality of 
his own experiences would use explicitly experiential descriptors 
(“being happy,” “feeling good about my life”) to identify the highest-
priority part of his life. 
A second body of research with some probative weight regarding 
nonexperiential preference arguments focuses on patients’ valuations 
of health states.76 This research is one portion of the larger quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) literature, which asks patients, health care 
providers, or members of the general population to value health 
states on a 0 to 1 scale (with 0 meaning a health state no better than 
death, and 1 meaning perfect health), using time-tradeoff, standard-
gamble, or direct-rating questions.77 
 
 76. See generally Xavier Badia, Michael Herdman & Paul Kind, The Influence of Ill-Health 
Experience on the Valuation of Health, 13 PHARMACOECONOMICS 687 (1998); Laura J. 
Damschroder, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Peter A. Ubel, Considering Adaptation in Preference 
Elicitations, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 394 (2008) [hereinafter Damschroder et al., Considering 
Adaptation]; Laura J. Damschroder, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Peter A. Ubel, The Impact of 
Considering Adaptation in Health State Valuation, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 267 (2005); Jason Riis et 
al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary 
Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3 (2005); Dylan Smith et al., Mispredicting 
and Misremembering: Patients with Renal Failure Overestimate Improvements in Quality of Life 
After a Kidney Transplant, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 653 (2008); Dylan M. Smith, Stephanie L. 
Brown & Peter A. Ubel, Mispredictions and Misrecollections: Challenges for Subjective Outcome 
Measurement, 30 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 418 (2008); Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. 
Sherriff, Laura Damschroder, George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Misremembering 
Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 688 (2006) [hereinafter Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies]; Peter A. Ubel, 
George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions 
Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED 111 (2005); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients 
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a 
Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190 (2001); Peter A. Ubel, George 
Loewenstein, Norbert Schwarz & Dylan Smith, Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability 
Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (2005) [hereinafter Ubel 
et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable]; Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein & Christopher 
Jepson, Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies Between Health State 
Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY LIFE RES. 599 (2003) [hereinafter 
Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?]. 
 77. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 & n.1, 8–9 nn. 25–26 (2006) (collecting sources). 
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The literature on the hedonic effects of disease documents 
substantial, sometimes complete hedonic adaptation. “[N]umerous 
studies have found that people with chronic health conditions as 
severe as kidney failure or paraplegia report moods that are relatively 
close to those reported by healthy persons . . . .”78 Still, healthy 
individuals frequently assign low QALY values to disease states. This 
itself does not show that healthy individuals have an intrinsic 
preference not to be diseased. Perhaps, instead, they care mainly 
about affects and feelings but underestimate the extent of hedonic 
adaptation to disease. 
More interesting, here, is the fact that patients themselves tend to 
give QALY values lower than 1 to their diseases. Several general 
findings emerge from research about patient valuations. First, these 
valuations are higher than healthy individuals’.79 Second, these 
valuations are still substantially below the top of the scale: “both 
patients and healthy people agree that living with a chronic health 
condition is worse than living in perfect health . . . .”80 
Because patients (unlike members of the general population) are 
aware of the moods and feelings associated with their disease, a 
QALY rating below 1 does suggest an intrinsic preference for 
health.81 For example, in one striking study, Dylan Smith and his co-
authors asked both individuals with colostomies and former 
colostomy patients whose bowel function had subsequently been 
restored to (1) quantify their current moods and life satisfaction using 
standard SWB questions, and (2) assign a QALY value to having a 
colostomy, using a time-tradeoff question (which asks about 
willingness to reduce life span in return for a health improvement).82 
Current patients reported, on average, a degree of life satisfaction 
only slightly lower than that of former patients and better moods. In 
other words, hedonic adaptation to having a colostomy seems to be 
virtually complete. However, current patients also, on average, 
expressed a willingness to reduce their life span by 16 percent in 
exchange for a return to perfect health.83 This seems to be substantial 
 
 78. Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19, at 1799. 
 79. This finding has been termed the “disability paradox.” Ubel et al., Misimagining the 
Unimaginable, supra note 76, at S57. 
 80. Damschroder et al., Considering Adaptation, supra note 76, at 394. 
 81. See Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19, at 1799–1800, 1803. 
 82. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies, supra note 76, at 689–90.  
 83. See id. at 192 tbl.2. The life-satisfaction and mood differences between current and 
former patients were not statistically significant. Id. 
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(if not conclusive) evidence that colostomy patients care about 
healthy bowel function as such, not just about the moods and feelings 
associated with having or lacking a healthy bowel.84 
To sum up, the extent to which individuals intrinsically care 
about nonexperiential aspects of their lives warrants much more 
intensive study. The existing body of empirical work bearing on this 
issue is quite small and hardly suffices to demonstrate that individuals 
generally lack such preferences. Policy tools for implementing a 
preference-based account of well-being should therefore be 
structured to allow for the possibility that some individuals, at least, 
have preferences with nonexperiential fundamental arguments. 
C. The Policy Relevance of Subjective Well-Being Surveys: Two 
Defenses 
We can now distinguish two possible defenses of the policy 
relevance of SWB surveys. By SWB survey, again, I mean a survey 
that asks for a numerical rating of the respondent’s overall or 
momentary happiness, life satisfaction, or some other aspect of her 
mental life. 
One defense, the PR (preference-realization) defense, adopts a 
preference view of well-being—analyzing an individual’s well-being in 
terms of the realization of her preferences, and allowing that the 
fundamental arguments for those preferences can include items other 
than her mental states (such as her health, liberty, relationships, 
accomplishments, and so forth). The content of individual i’s ranking 
of possible outcomes, Ri, is for her to determine; her self-rated SWB, 
in turn, is taken as a defeasible indicator of whether the actual 
outcome is located high or low in this ranking. 
Why would this be the case? Although preference realization 
and the preference-holder’s feelings of satisfaction are distinct, there 
is some plausibility in thinking that an individual’s answer to an SWB 
survey is good if not perfect evidence of her preference realization. 
After all (so the account goes) the typical arguments for preferences, 
if not necessarily mental states, are still features of the world to which 
individuals have good epistemic access. Some proportion of the 
population will be hypochondriacs, some proportion will be in denial 
about their diseases, but most people will know pretty well how 
 
 84. It is not conclusive because colostomy patients may be mispredicting the hedonic 
benefit of a return to perfect health. 
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healthy they are. Some poor souls will be deceived by spouses, 
friends, or colleagues, but many others will have an accurate sense of 
the quality of their social lives. 
A quite different defense, the EQ (experience-quality) defense, 
sees an appropriately designed SWB survey as evidence of the quality 
of an individual’s mental states. For example, an individual who says 
her happiness is 7 on a 1 to 7 scale gives us strong evidence that her 
current mood and emotions are positive and that she is not in pain. 
These facts about her mental life (specifically, her affective state) 
contribute favorably to her well-being. Or, an individual who says she 
is “not satisfied” indicates that she is currently feeling unsatisfied—
and, plausibly, feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction also are 
mental facts relevant to well-being. The EQ defense might be allied 
to an experientialist account of well-being, and thus take the strong 
form. Less ambitiously, the EQ defense might reject or bracket the 
experientialism requirement, and instead claim only that good mental 
states are one dimension of well-being, and that SWB surveys in turn 
provide evidence regarding this dimension. 
More simply, this duality of roles for SWB surveys can be 
expressed using Kahneman’s bifurcation between decision utility 
(better, preference utility) and experience utility.85 An individual’s 
answer to an SWB survey might be evidence of her preference utility. 
Alternatively, it might be evidence of her experience utility. 
Figure 1. Possible Defenses of the Policy Relevance of Subjective Well-
Being Surveys
 
 
 85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
The PR defense: 
SWB surveys as 
evidence of 
preference utility 
The EQ defense: 
SWB surveys as 
evidence of 
experience utility
“Strong”: well-
being is no more 
than good 
mental states
“Weak”: good 
mental states are 
one component 
of well-being 
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In the remainder of this Article, I carefully work through this 
flowchart. 
Some SWB scholars will be impatient with close consideration of 
the PR account. “This is just a straw man,” they might say. “The point 
of SWB surveys is obviously to measure experience utility, not 
preference utility.” 
However, a careful reading of SWB scholarship suggests that 
some prominent SWB researchers do adopt the PR defense. For 
example, Andrew Clark, Michael Frijters, and Paul Shields, in a wide-
ranging article on the Easterlin paradox, explain that they see this as 
a paradox concerning decision utility. The flat time trend of SWB 
scores suggests (as they see it) that increasing per-capita GDP makes 
little difference to decision utility over time within a given country.86 
They propose to “explain” the paradox by constructing a decision 
utility function that includes relative as well as absolute income as 
arguments and that incorporates adaptation effects. As they explain: 
The explanation of the Easterlin paradox detailed in this paper rests 
on the ways in which income translates into utility. It is important to 
be clear about the logical step that we are taking here. While the 
paradox is couched in terms of income and happiness, we are going 
to appeal to a specific type of utility function to account for it. In 
other words, we imagine that happiness scores provide information 
about utility. . . . Section 4 will then explicitly set out the evidence 
linking happiness and utility.87 
And what they then write at the beginning of Section 4 is: “In this 
section we ask what basis there is for believing that happiness is a 
reasonable measure of the economic notion of (decision) utility, i.e., 
the thing whose maximization leads to choice behavior.”88 
 
 86. Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields, Relative Income, Happiness, and 
Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
95, 99–106, 115 (2008). The “paradox,” first observed by Richard Easterlin, is the substantial 
growth of income in many countries without a corresponding rise in happiness levels. Id. at 95. 
But see Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Subjective Wellbeing, Income, 
Economic Development and Growth, in . . . AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: WELL-BEING 
AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 59, 59 (Philip Booth ed., 2012) (challenging the existence of 
the paradox). 
 87. Clark et al., supra note 86, at 99 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). At the conclusion of Section 4 of the article, Clark et al. 
note reason for caution about “the link between happiness and utility” and here, again, make 
explicit that by “utility” they mean “decision utility.” Id. at 121; see also Erik Angner, Subjective 
Well-Being: When, and Why, It Matters 18 (Aug. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2157140 (suggesting that a happiness 
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Others defend SWB surveys as evidence of “utility” without 
disambiguating that term.89 Indeed, the failure of the literature to 
draw a sharp distinction between SWB surveys as evidence of 
preference versus experience utility—notwithstanding Kahneman’s 
terminological efforts—is one aspect of the conceptual fuzziness of 
this literature. The statement that SWB surveys are policy-relevant 
because they indicate “utility” invites the careless reader to commit a 
fallacy of equivocation—hybridizing the strong evidentiary role of 
SWB surveys qua experience utility, and the welfare relevance of 
preference realization. The equivocation runs as follows: “SWB 
surveys provide powerful evidence of (experience) utility. But of 
course (preference) utility is policy-relevant, on a preference account 
of well-being. Thus SWB surveys are policy-relevant.” 
It is therefore important to separate out the PR and EQ 
accounts—more specifically, to show why the PR account is 
problematic (Part II of this Article), before turning to the more 
plausible view that SWB surveys are useful evidence to governments 
in providing information about the quality of individuals’ mental 
states. 
II.  DO SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS FURNISH GOOD 
EVIDENCE OF PREFERENCE UTILITY? 
This Part critically evaluates the possible use of SWB scores as 
evidence of preference utility. Section A outlines some significant 
obstacles to such inference: scale recalibration, preference 
heterogeneity, evaluation error, and miscommunication. Section B 
discusses the extent to which these potential obstacles can be 
circumvented via econometric techniques. 
To be sure, SWB surveys might be imperfect evidence of 
preference utility but still better evidence than other sources. Section 
C argues to the contrary. Stated-preference surveys dominate SWB 
surveys as evidence of preference utility. If well-being reduces to 
 
measure can provide useful information about preference-realization insofar as individuals want 
happiness or happiness is sufficiently correlated with preference-realization); Peter Railton, 
Subjective Well-Being as Information and Guidance 33 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://profron.net/happiness/files/readings/Railton_SubjectiveWellBeing.pdf 
(suggesting that the affective and life-satisfaction components of an individual’s SWB provide 
information about her success in attaining, respectively, short-term and long-term goals). 
 89. See, e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 24, at 1361; Rafael Di Tella & Robert 
MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 25, 
28. 
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preference realization, and if surveys (in addition to behavioral data) 
provide useful information about what individuals prefer, SWB 
surveys have no advantages over stated-preference surveys and many 
disadvantages. 
In much of this Part, I focus on the proposal to use SWB surveys 
to calculate monetary equivalents for nonmarket goods. On the PR 
account of SWB surveys, this proposal says that SWB surveys are 
useful information regarding the amount that individuals are willing 
to pay/accept for those goods. It will be helpful, in assessing the value 
of SWB surveys, to do so with reference to a specific policy tool that 
such surveys might be seen as informing. And the monetary-
equivalent proposal is one of the key recommendations to emerge 
from the SWB literature. Moreover (as will be explained below) this 
proposal is less informationally demanding than proposals that 
require the summation or averaging of SWB scores (for example, the 
calculation of gross national happiness). The use of SWB surveys to 
calculate willingness-to-pay/accept (WTP/WTA) amounts requires 
only that the surveys evidence individuals’ ordinal preference utility. 
Thus, if they perform poorly in this ordinal role—as I will contend—
then a fortiori they are problematic as evidence of individuals’ 
cardinal preference utilities.90 
This Part generally focuses on life-satisfaction rather than 
happiness questions. Asking an individual to quantify how satisfied 
she is with her life would seem to be a relatively more promising 
vehicle for ascertaining her degree of preference utility than asking 
her how happy she is. If life-satisfaction questions are, in fact, poor 
evidence of preference utility—as I will contend—then a fortiori 
happiness questions are as well. 
Finally, so as to simplify the exposition, I will assume that each 
individual’s preference ranking of outcomes is solely a function of her 
own attributes in the outcomes. Individual i prefers outcome x to 
outcome x* just in case she prefers A to A*, where A are her 
attributes in x and A* in x*.91 “Attributes” is understood in a broad 
 
 90. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 91. To say that a given individual i prefers bundle A to bundle A* is a shorthand for saying: 
i prefers it to be the case that she has attributes A, as opposed to it being the case that she has 
attributes A*. Thus, when we compare how various individuals rank a given set of attribute 
bundles, we are not comparing how those individuals rank the very same states of affairs. 
Rather, we are comparing how one individual ranks states of affairs specified as those in which 
she has various possible attributes, to how a second individual ranks states of affairs specified as 
those in which he has various possible attributes. 
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sense to include nonmental and relational attributes. An individual’s 
health is an attribute, as is the quality of public goods she enjoys, or 
the happiness of her children. This ranking is representable by a 
preference-utility function ui(.), such that i prefers attribute bundle A 
to A* if and only if ui(A) > ui(A*). 
A. Inferring Preference Utility from Life-Satisfaction Questions: 
Some Obstacles 
1. Scale Recalibration and Preference Heterogeneity.  Preference 
heterogeneity and scale recalibration (heterogeneity in the utility 
scales used to express preferences) are conceptually distinct obstacles 
to inferring preferences from life-satisfaction surveys, but for 
expository purposes are discussed in tandem here. 
Imagine that Phyllis has a current income of y and a level z of 
some nonincome attribute (an environmental good, health, etc.). 
Asked how satisfied she is with her life, she says “7.” Gina has a 
smaller current income of y*, which is less than y by amount ∆y. Her 
level of the other attribute is z*, which exceeds z by amount ∆z. 
When asked how satisfied she is with her life, Gina also says “7.” 
Assume, now, that the following are true. (1) Phyllis and Gina 
have identical preferences. Each has the very same ranking of 
attribute packages (here, combinations of income and the nonincome 
attribute). For every A and A*, either both individuals prefer A to A*, 
or both prefer A* to A, or both are indifferent. (2) Each uses the 
same numerical scale to express her ranking of attribute packages. In 
other words, Phyllis articulates her ranking via a preference-utility 
function uPhyllis(.), such that uPhyllis(A) > uPhyllis(A*) whenever Phyllis 
prefers A to A*. And—it turns out—the preference-utility function 
uGina(.) by means of which Gina expresses her ranking of the bundles is 
exactly the same function as uPhyllis(.). For every bundle A, uPhyllis(A) = 
uGina(A). 
Finally, (3) Gina and Phyllis each respond to a life-satisfaction 
question by articulating her preference utility for her current attribute 
package. When Gina possesses attribute bundle A and is asked “How 
satisfied are you with your life?,” the answer she gives is just uGina(A). 
Similarly, if Phyllis possesses bundle B and is asked the same 
question, the answer she gives is uPhyllis(B). 
If all of the premises just mentioned hold true, we can make 
inferences about Phyllis and Gina’s WTP/WTA amounts for the 
nonincome attribute. For example, in the case described three 
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paragraphs above, we can infer that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone else 
with the same preferences as them is willing to pay ∆y dollars for an 
increase in the z attribute by amount ∆z. If the case were varied, so 
that Gina’s answer to the life-satisfaction question is a number 
greater than 7, we could infer that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone with the 
same preferences is willing to pay more than ∆y for an increase in the 
z attribute by amount ∆z. Finally, an answer less than 7 would 
indicate that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone with the same preferences is 
willing to pay less than ∆y for that increase in the z attribute. 
But consider, now, relaxing the premise of identical scales. As 
economists are very well-aware, a utility function representing an 
ordering of attribute bundles (or any other items) is hardly unique; 
rather, it is unique only up to an ordinal (“increasing”) 
transformation.92 Even though Phyllis and Gina have the same 
ranking of possible bundles, it need not be the case that uPhyllis(.)—the 
mathematical function which Phyllis uses to express that ranking—is 
the same as uGina(.). For example, if there are six bundles, and each of 
the women prefers the first to the second, the second to the third, and 
so forth, then Phyllis might express this preference via the numbers 9, 
8, 7, 6, 5, 4, whereas Gina might use the numbers 6, 5.5, 4, 3.5, 3, 2.5. 
Even holding fixed the assumption of identical preferences, scale 
heterogeneity interferes with our ability to make inferences regarding 
Phyllis’s and Gina’s WTP/WTA amounts. Back to the case in which 
Phyllis with attributes (y, z) says that her life satisfaction is 7, and 
Gina with attributes (y − ∆y, z + ∆z) also says that her life satisfaction 
is 7. What can we infer about how much Phyllis and Gina are willing 
to pay for an increase in the z attribute by ∆z? Not much. It might be 
the case that they are willing to pay exactly ∆y for ∆z. But it might 
also be that they are willing to pay less than ∆y. (Imagine that both 
Phyllis and Gina prefer the package (y, z) to the package (y − ∆y, z + 
∆z), but Phyllis represents this preference by assigning the number 7 
to the first package and 4 to the second, whereas Gina represents this 
preference by assigning the number 9 to the first package and 7 to the 
second.) Finally, it might be the case that they are willing to pay more 
than ∆y. 
Preference heterogeneity further complicates the picture. If we 
allow for the possibility that Phyllis and Gina may have different 
 
 92. Let u(.) be one function of attribute bundles, u*(.) a second. To say that u*(.) is an 
increasing transformation of u(.) means that whenever u(A) = u(B), u*(A) = u*(B) and 
whenever u(A) > u(B), u*(A) > u*(B). 
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rankings of the attribute bundles, the fact that Phyllis has told us her 
preference utility for one bundle (y, z), and Gina has told us her 
preference utility for one bundle (y − ∆y, z + ∆z), permits no 
inferences about whether Phyllis is willing to pay more, less, or 
exactly ∆y for ∆z. Nor does it permit inferences about whether Gina 
is willing to pay more, less, or exactly ∆y for ∆z. To make inferences 
about Phyllis’s WTP amount—absent an assumption of preference 
homogeneity—we would need to hear Phyllis express her preference 
utility for both bundles (and similarly for Gina).  
To see this in a yet simpler way: imagine that Phyllis is asked 
about her utility for chocolate ice cream and says “7,” whereas Gina 
is asked about her utility for vanilla ice cream and also says “7.” 
Unless we have some reason to believe that the two have the same 
tastes in ice cream (and also are using the same utility scale), can we 
conclude anything about whether Phyllis prefers chocolate, prefers 
vanilla, or is indifferent? Can we conclude anything about whether 
Gina prefers chocolate, prefers vanilla, or is indifferent? Of course 
not. 
Nor do problems of scale and preference heterogeneity 
disappear when we have multiple answers to life-satisfaction 
questions from the same person, as with longitudinal (panel) data. 
Vary the case under discussion so that Howard at Time 1, when he 
has income y and nonincome attribute z, says that his life satisfaction 
is 7. At Time 2, when Howard’s income has decreased to y − ∆y and 
his level of the nonincome attribute has increased to z + ∆z, he also 
says that his life satisfaction is 7. Can we infer that Howard’s WTP for 
∆z is ∆y? Not necessarily. One possibility is that Howard has the same 
ranking of attribute bundles at each time but uses a different 
preference-utility function to express that ranking at Time 2 than at 
Time 1. 
It is also possible that the ranking of bundles has itself shifted. 
There are various potential systematic sources of intrapersonal 
preference heterogeneity. For example, individuals’ preferences may 
tend to change as they age. A different kind of intrapersonal 
preference heterogeneity arises from adaptive/counteradaptive 
preferences. Imagine that an individual’s ranking of attribute bundles 
at a particular point in time varies, in a systematic way, with his past 
levels of the attributes. One possibility—adaptive preferences—
would be that higher levels of an attribute in the recent past tend to 
induce the individual to have a weaker preference for the attribute. 
For example, if the individual has a current income of $100,000 and 
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has had that income for several years, he may require more 
immediate income compensation for a given change in his health 
state, than if he has a current income of $100,000 but in prior years 
had an income of $50,000.93 Reciprocally, if higher levels of an 
attribute in the recent past induce a stronger preference for the 
attribute, the individual’s preferences would be counteradaptive. 
In short, inter- and intrapersonal preference heterogeneity and 
scale heterogeneity are—in principle—obstacles to inferring 
preferences from SWB surveys. What is the evidence that these 
phenomena actually occur? 
The empirical literature on preferences provides ample evidence 
of interpersonal preference heterogeneity. Numerous studies using 
standard preference data, other than SWB studies themselves (that is, 
behavioral data or stated-preference data), in various contexts, have 
confirmed the common-sense point that different individuals often 
have different rankings of commodity bundles, income-leisure 
bundles, different degrees of risk aversion, and so forth.94 
Moreover, various literatures document interpersonal “scale 
recalibration”: interpersonal heterogeneity in the numerical scales 
that individuals use to report various phenomena. For instance, a 
substantial literature documents interpersonal heterogeneity in health 
rating scales.95 Here are a few illustrative examples. In one study, 
Peter Ubel and his co-authors asked respondents to rate their own 
health on a scale from 0 to 100. One group was told that 100 
 
 93. For a formal model of adaptive preferences, see Clark et al., supra note 86, at 104–06. 
 94. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 279 n.57 (collecting sources). 
 95. E.g., Wim Groot, Adaptation and Scale of Reference Bias in Self-Assessments of Quality 
of Life, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 403 (2000); Heather P. Lacey et al., Are They Really That Happy? 
Exploring Scale Recalibration in Estimates of Well-Being, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 669 (2008); 
Maarten Lindeboom & Eddy van Doorslaer, Cut-Point Shift and Index Shift in Self-Reported 
Health, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 1083 (2004); Erik Meijer, Arie Kapteyn & Tatiana Andreyeva, 
Internationally Comparable Health Indices, 20 HEALTH ECON. 600 (2011); Debby Postulart & 
Eddy M.M. Adang, Response Shift and Adaptation in Chronically Ill Patients, 20 MED. 
DECISION MAKING 186 (2000); Joshua A. Salomon, Ajay Tandon & Christopher J.L. Murray, 
Comparability of Self Rated Health: Cross Sectional Multi-Country Survey Using Anchoring 
Vignettes, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 258 (2004), doi:10.1136/bmj.37963.691632.44; Amir Shmueli, 
Reporting Heterogeneity in the Measurement of Health and Health-Related Quality of Life, 20 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 405 (2002); Amir Shmueli, Socio-Economic and Demographic 
Variation in Health and in Its Measures: The Issue of Reporting Heterogeneity, 57 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 125 (2003); Mirjam A.G. Sprangers & Carolyn E. Schwartz, Integrating Response Shift 
into Health-Related Quality of Life Research: A Theoretical Model, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1507 
(1999); Peter A. Ubel, Aleksandra Jankovic, Dylan Smith, Kenneth M. Langa & Angela 
Fagerlin, What Is Perfect Health to an 85-Year-Old?: Evidence for Scale Recalibration in 
Subjective Health Ratings, 43 MED. CARE 1054 (2005). 
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represented “perfect health”; a second, that it represented “perfect 
health for someone your age”; a third, that it represented “perfect 
health for a 20-year-old.”96 The third scale was anchored on a specific 
age, whereas the second was anchored on the respondent’s age. 
Average ratings using the first two scales were very close. By contrast, 
average ratings using the third were lower—suggesting that 
respondents interpreted “perfect health” as “perfect health for 
someone your age,” a kind of recalibration.97 
In another study, Joshua Salomon and his co-authors presented 
respondents in different countries with “mobility vignettes”: 
descriptions of hypothetical subjects, highlighting their ability to 
move around, using language such as the following: “Rina has had a 
stiff neck for the last 10 days and it makes her move around slowly as 
any sudden movement causes pain.” Or, “Louis is able to move his 
arms and legs, but requires assistance in standing up from a chair or 
walking around the house. Any bending is painful, and lifting is 
impossible.”98 Respondents were asked to describe the subject’s 
degree of mobility, using five ordered categories: no, mild, moderate, 
severe, or extreme difficulty moving around. Respondents tended to 
order the vignettes similarly, but to vary by country and age in their 
application of the five categories, suggesting scale heterogeneity. For 
example, both Chinese and Sri Lankan respondents might tend to 
place Louis in a less mobile category than Rina; but the plurality of 
Sri Lankans might rate Louis as having “extreme” difficulty with 
respect to mobility, whereas the plurality of Chinese might rate his 
difficulty as “severe.”99 
As already mentioned, individuals with a particular disease tend 
to assign higher QALY values to that disease than do members of the 
general population.100 There are at least three different explanations 
for this divergence: (1) patients and members of the general 
population have different factual understandings of the impact of the 
disease state on the patient’s life (for example, its hedonic impact); 
(2) patients and members of the general population have different 
preferences regarding disease states; and (3) patients and members of 
the general population use different rating scales to express their 
 
 96. Ubel et al., supra note 95, at 1055 tbl.1.  
 97. Id. at 1056. 
 98. Salomon et al., supra note 95, at 2. 
 99. Id. at 3–4. 
 100. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. 
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preferences (scale recalibration).101 The relative importance of these 
three explanations is contested, but substantial evidence suggests that 
scale recalibration is at least one part of the picture.102 
Heterogeneity in health rating scales may furnish direct evidence 
of heterogeneity in preference-utility scales. In some contexts, 
individuals are using the health number to express their preferences 
over health states. At a minimum, heterogeneity in the scales used to 
assign numbers to health states or other phenomena provides 
circumstantial evidence of scale recalibration with respect to 
preference utility. If individuals vary in how they use numbers to rate 
health, height,103 political efficacy, or visual acuity,104 then (absent 
evidence to the contrary) we should be worried about variation in 
preference-utility scales. 
Bernard van Praag’s survey work using “income evaluation” 
questions is an important body of research—suggestive either of 
heterogeneity with respect to individuals’ preferences regarding 
income, or heterogeneity in preference-utility scales. The respondent 
was asked to state the range of incomes she considered to fall in each 
of six categories: “very bad,” “bad,” “insufficient,” “sufficient,” 
“good,” and “very good.”105 The cutoffs for each category were then 
correlated with the respondent’s characteristics, including her actual 
income. Van Praag found that an increase in respondent’s income 
tended to shift each range upward. The more the respondent’s actual 
income, the larger a hypothetical income amount had to be before she 
would categorize it as “very good,” “good,” “sufficient,” and so forth. 
My discussion, thus far, has focused on studies that document 
interpersonal preference heterogeneity and/or scale recalibration via 
cross-sectional research designs, showing how different people rank 
 
 101. To be sure, scale recalibration would only be relevant for QALY values elicited via 
ratings, rather than via time-tradeoff or standard-gamble questions.  
 102. See Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?, supra note 76, at 604–05. 
 103. See Andrew J. Oswald, On the Curvature of the Reporting Function from Objective 
Reality to Subjective Feelings, 100 ECON. LETTERS 369, 370–71 (2008). 
 104. See Gary King, Christopher J.L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon & Ajay Tandon, 
Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research, 
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 191 (2004) (discussing the use of “vignettes” to correct for scale 
heterogeneity, and illustrating this technique with respect to measures of political efficacy and 
visual acuity); see also Mary Steffel & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Happy by What Standard? The 
Role of Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Comparisons in Ratings of Happiness, 92 SOC. 
INDICATORS RES. 69 (2009) (finding scale heterogeneity with respect to happiness scales). 
 105. See BERNARD M.S. VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS 
QUANTIFIED: A SATISFACTION CALCULUS APPROACH 5–6, 34–42 (2004). 
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or rate various phenomena. There appears to be less work using 
longitudinal data, which could directly evidence intrapersonal 
preference heterogeneity or scale recalibration. However, cross-
sectional studies may be suggestive of intrapersonal phenomena. For 
example, a cross-sectional finding that older respondents use a 
different scale than younger respondents to rate their health suggests 
that a given individual will tend to change her health-rating scale as 
she ages. Van Praag’s research on income evaluation questions is 
some evidence of adaptive preferences with respect to income. 
In sum, more research is needed, but existing empirical work 
provides evidence of preference heterogeneity and heterogeneity in 
preference-utility scales. These are empirically genuine—not merely 
theoretical—obstacles to using SWB surveys to infer preference 
utility. 
2. Evaluation Error and Miscommunication.  Return again to the 
case in which Gina, while in possession of a particular attribute 
bundle, quantifies her life satisfaction as a particular number, and 
Phyllis, while in possession of a different bundle, also quantifies her 
life satisfaction as that same number. As discussed, if Gina and Phyllis 
(1) have the same preferences, represented via (2) the same 
preference-utility function, and in addition (3) the answer each gives 
to a life-satisfaction survey is exactly equal to her preference utility 
for her current attributes, then we can infer their common 
WTP/WTA amounts. 
“Evaluation error” and “miscommunication” constitute different 
types of failure of this last condition. The respondent may misapply 
the utility function to her actual bundle of attributes: this is 
“evaluation error.” Although her actual attributes are bundle B, Gina 
incorrectly perceives her current preference utility to be some value 
other than uGina(B). When asked, “How satisfied are you with your 
life?,” Gina articulates that value, not uGina(B). 
Alternatively, Gina’s perceived preference utility may be correct 
(she has attributes B, and indeed perceives her preference utility to 
be uGina(B)); but she responds to the question “How satisfied are you 
with your life?” by articulating some value other than her perceived 
preference utility. 
A 1999 book chapter by Norbert Schwarz and Fritz Strack, 
reviewing research on the psychology of life-satisfaction questions, 
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provides ample evidence of both of these effects.106 Consider, first, 
evaluation error. This can arise in various ways. The respondent’s 
preferences might depend upon features of outcomes about which she 
has imperfect information107 (as in the example of a preference for a 
faithful spouse). Or she might possess the relevant information, but 
fail to access it. Schwarz and Strack show how the latter occurs: the 
survey instrument, the respondent’s mood, or recent events may focus 
her attention on certain information about her current attributes and 
divert attention from other data. 
When asked, “Taking all things together, how would you say things 
are these days?” respondents are ideally assumed to review the 
myriad of relevant aspects of their lives and to integrate them into a 
mental representation of their life as a whole. In reality, however, 
individuals rarely retrieve all information that may be relevant to a 
judgment. Instead, they truncate the search process as soon as 
enough information has come to mind to form a judgment with 
sufficient subjective certainty. Hence, the judgment is based on the 
information that is most accessible at that point in time. In general, 
the accessibility of information depends on the recency and 
frequency of its use.108 
For example, researchers found a strong correlation between 
respondent’s dating frequency and life satisfaction only when the 
question about dating frequency preceded the life-satisfaction 
question.109 
Schwarz and Strack also identify much evidence of mood effects. 
[J]udgments of well-being are a function not only of what one thinks 
about but also of how one feels at the time of judgment. A wide 
range of experimental data confirms this intuition. Finding a dime 
on a copy machine, spending time in a pleasant rather than an 
 
 106. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental 
Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 61. The terms “evaluation error” and 
“miscommunication” are my own; Schwarz and Strack do not use these terms.  
 107. Cf. Hendrik Jürges, Unemployment, Life Satisfaction and Retrospective Error, 170 J. 
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 43, 44 (2007) (discussing the effect of inaccurate memory on survey 
responses). 
 108. Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 63 (citations omitted). A recent review concludes: 
“What information people attend to when responding to surveys can strongly affect life 
satisfaction judgments.” Ed Diener, Ronald Inglehart & Louis Tay, Theory and Validity of Life 
Satisfaction Scales, SOC. INDICATORS RES. 11 (2012), link.springer.com/article/10.1007
%2Fs11205-012-0076-y?LI=true.  
 109. Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 63. 
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unpleasant room, or watching the German soccer team win rather 
than lose a championship game all resulted in increased reports of 
happiness and satisfaction with one’s life as a whole.110 
Mood effects might involve a kind of evaluation error: mood 
makes salient or less visible “mood-congruent” or incongruent 
information, respectively. (In plainer English: happy people tend to 
see the ways in which their lives are fulfilling their preferences, less 
happy people the ways in which they are not.) Mood effects might 
instead fall under the heading of miscommunication: the respondent 
might understand a life-satisfaction question as asking for a 
quantitative measure of her hedonic states—for experience utility—
rather than for her preference utility. 
“Miscommunication” is a broad category: anything that leads the 
respondent to articulate some number other than her perceived 
preference utility for her current attributes is a kind of 
miscommunication. For example, cultural norms may encourage 
individuals with especially high or low levels of preference utility to 
communicate a more mediocre number (or, conversely, push 
individuals whose preferences are only modestly realized to claim 
greater success).111 Depending on the order of questions, 
conversational norms may induce the respondent to articulate her 
“domain satisfaction”—subutility for a subset of attributes—rather 
than her preference utility for the totality of her attributes.112 
3. A Note on Cardinality.  Much work in economics distinguishes 
between ordinal and cardinal utility. For purposes of the present 
discussion, the distinction can be framed as follows. 
An individual’s ordinal preference-utility function captures her 
ranking of attribute bundles. The function uGina(.) is an ordinal utility 
function for Gina if, whenever Gina ranks one bundle over a second 
bundle, this function assigns the first a higher number. As already 
discussed, an ordinal utility function is not unique, but merely unique 
up to an increasing transformation. If uGina(.) is an ordinal utility 
 
 110. Id. at 74 (citations omitted). Subsequent findings with respect to weather effects have 
been mixed. See Diener et al., supra note 108, at 18–19; Sylvia Kämpfer & Michael Mutz, On the 
Sunny Side of Life: Sunshine Effects on Life Satisfaction, 110 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 579 (2013). 
 111. On cultural differences in responses to SWB surveys, see generally Shigehiro Oishi & 
Ed Diener, Culture and Well-Being: The Cycle of Action, Evaluation, and Decision, 29 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 939 (2003). 
 112. See Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 64. 
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function for Gina, and u*(.) an increasing transformation of uGina(.), 
then u*(.) is also an ordinal utility function for Gina. 
An individual’s cardinal preference-utility function not only 
captures her ranking of attribute bundles, but also captures some 
other feature of her preferences (for example, her ranking of lotteries 
over bundles, or her time-tradeoff preferences), such that the utility 
numbers assigned to bundles can meaningfully be added together.113 
Using SWB surveys to infer preference utility so as to calculate 
WTP/WTA amounts rests upon the various assumptions surveyed in 
this Section, namely, that the individuals surveyed have the same 
preferences, that their answers to the SWB survey are not corrupted 
by evaluation error or miscommunication, and that these individuals 
express their preferences using the same preference-utility function. 
But using surveys to infer WTP/WTA amounts does not rest upon the 
further assumption that this common utility function is cardinal. 
To see why not, assume that Phyllis and Gina have the same 
preferences (the same ranking of attribute bundles) and express this 
ranking using the very same utility function u(.). Phyllis says that her 
life satisfaction with bundle (y, z) is 7 because u(y, z) is 7. Gina says 
her life satisfaction with bundle (y − ∆y, z + ∆z) is 7 because u(y − ∆y, 
z + ∆z) is 7. Then we can correctly infer that Phyllis and Gina are 
each willing to pay exactly ∆y for ∆z. And—here’s the critical point—
we could infer the same if Phyllis and Gina were using u*(.) rather 
than u(.) to express their common bundle rankings, where u*(.) is any 
increasing transformation of u(.). 
 
 113. Defining cardinality is a subtle matter, and the definition offered here is rough, but will 
suffice for the purpose of this Article. Assume that i has a preference structure represented by 
v(.) and by any other function v*(.) just in case v*(.) is an eligible transformation of v(.). For 
example, it is well known that, in the case of preferences regarding lotteries, v*(.) needs to be a 
positive linear transformation of v(.), that is, v*(.) = av(.) + b, with a positive. Similarly, in the 
case of time-tradeoff preferences, v*(.) may need to be a positive ratio transformation of v(.), 
that is, v*(.) = av(.), with a positive. 
  Now consider two possible series of attribute packages: A, B, … versus Aʹ, 
Bʹ, …. Utility function v(.) is cardinal if it represents a feature of preferences such that, for every 
eligible v*(.), v(A) + v(B) + … ≥ v(Aʹ) + v(Bʹ) + … if and only if v*(A) + v*(B) + … ≥ v*(Aʹ) + 
v*(Bʹ) + …. Utility function v(.) and all eligible transformations thereof assign overall sums to 
series of packages so as to rank these series the same way. It is therefore “meaningful” to 
engage in an operation such as v(A) + v(B) + …, and so v(.) can be termed “cardinal.”  
  Note that, if v*(.) is a positive ratio transformation, v(.) is cardinal. Moreover, if all 
series being compared have the same number of terms, and v*(.) is a positive linear 
transformation, v(.) is cardinal. Thus “cardinality,” in the scholarly literature, is often associated 
with being a ratio and/or linear transformation. 
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However, some plausible uses of SWB data do require cardinal 
utility. Consider, in particular, the proposal to calculate gross/average 
happiness of various groups, either entire nations or subnational 
groups. For purposes of this Part, let us construe this as the proposal 
to use SWB surveys so as to estimate the gross/average preference 
utility of various groups. 
Such a proposal imposes an additional demand upon such 
surveys: namely, that respondents have the same preferences, be 
uncorrupted by evaluation error or miscommunication, and respond 
to the survey by applying a common cardinal utility function to their 
current attributes. For example, imagine that there are bundles A, B, 
C, and D. Phyllis and Gina each prefer A to B to C to D. They also 
have other common preferences (for example, a common ranking of 
attribute lotteries, or common time-tradeoff preferences), accurately 
represented by a cardinal preference-utility function v(.), which 
assigns the bundles the values v(A) = 20, v(B) = 15, v(C) = 10, v(D) = 
0. 
Imagine that, in 2010, Phyllis has bundle A and Gina has bundle 
D. In 2011, Phyllis has bundle B and Gina has bundle C. This means 
that the two individuals’ average preference utility has increased over 
time, from (20+0)/2 to (15+10)/2. 
Imagine, now, that we try to infer the time trend in their average 
preference utility by looking at the time trend in their average 
numerical responses to SWB surveys. If Gina and Phyllis answer 
those surveys by articulating preference-utility values that are ordinal 
but not cardinal, our inference may be incorrect. Consider the ordinal 
(but not cardinal) utility function u(.), such that u(A) = 7, u(B) = 5, 
u(C) = 4, u(D) = 3. If Gina and Phyllis each use this common function 
in responding to the question “How satisfied are you with your life?,” 
asked in 2010 and 2011, their average SWB score decreases. 
In short, anyone proposing to use SWB scores to engage in 
interpersonal aggregation or averaging of preference-utility values 
must, inter alia, have strong expectations about how respondents 
understand the SWB-elicitation question. Respondents must interpret 
the question as asking for their preference utility (rather than as 
asking for a measure of their current mood, happiness, and so forth), 
and indeed as asking for their cardinal preference utility. It seems 
wildly speculative that most respondents do in fact interpret a 
standard SWB question (“How satisfied are you with your life?”) as 
asking for their cardinal preference utility. 
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B. Will Econometric Methodology Solve the Problem? 
To what extent can econometric techniques mitigate the 
difficulties identified in the previous Section?114 This Section briefly 
discusses the question. With apologies to some readers, it 
presupposes a basic knowledge of econometrics. 
Assume—to begin—that the pool of respondents has 
homogeneous preferences. However, they are characterized, 
potentially, by scale heterogeneity, evaluation error, and 
miscommunication. 
The standard approach researchers employ is to estimate the 
determinants of SWB using ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
estimating equation is SWBit = βxit + εit, with xit being a vector of 
individual i’s attributes at time t, including income. The ratio of the 
coefficient in for some nonincome good, to the coefficient on 
income, immediately yields an estimate of individuals’ WTP for the 
good. 
The error term in this equation, εit, serves to handle certain kinds 
of scale heterogeneity, evaluation error, and miscommunication—
namely, when these are caused by unobserved factors that are 
uncorrelated with the observed attributes catalogued in xit. For 
example, random variations in day-to-day weather may deflate or 
inflate individuals’ moods, randomly changing the mix of information 
about attributes that is salient to individuals. Transient psychological 
factors may cause an individual to shift upward or downward the 
preference scale used to express the (common) attribute ranking.115 
However, the flaw in this strategy—well-recognized by many 
economists in the SWB literature116—is that there may be unobserved 
 
 114. For helpful discussions of econometric issues in SWB surveys, see Andrew Clark, 
Fabrice Etilé, Fabien Postel-Vinay, Claudia Senik & Karine Van der Straeten, Heterogeneity in 
Reported Well-Being, 115 ECON. J. C118 (2005); Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, How 
Important Is Methodology for the Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?, 114 ECON. J. 641 
(2004); Simon Luechinger, Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach, 119 ECON. 
J. 482 (2009); Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being, 120 
Q.J. ECON. 963 (2005); and Nattavudh Powdthavee, How Much Does Money Really Matter? 
Estimating the Causal Effects of Income on Happiness, 39 EMPIRICAL ECON. 77 (2010); Dolan et 
al., supra note 11.  
 115. Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 24, at 1361–62. 
 116. See supra note 114; see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People 
Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 67, 67, 71–72 (2001) (arguing against the use of SWB and similar surveys to predict the 
effect of observable individual attributes on individuals’ attitudes because of the correlation of 
measurement error with those attributes). 
̂
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individual-specific factors that both cause variation in stated SWB 
and cause (or otherwise are correlated with) the attributes in xit. For 
example, the fact that an individual is unusually happy may both 
make her prone to evaluation errors or miscommunications that shift 
upward the preference-utility scale and cause her to earn higher 
income. 
In response to difficulties of this sort, panel data is often used to 
estimate an OLS equation with individual fixed effects: 
SWBit = βxit + fi + εit. But there are a number of reasons to think that 
this strategy is not a full response to the difficulties under discussion. 
One point, a technical one, is that OLS with individual fixed 
effects assumes a dependent cardinal variable. As discussed earlier, it 
is far from clear whether an individual in responding to a life-
satisfaction question is articulating her perceived cardinal (rather 
than merely ordinal) utility. Ordinal utility should be estimated via 
ordered probit or logit—and incorporating fixed effects in these 
models yields a biased estimate of β. 
A second and more substantive worry is that the fixed-effect 
methodology controls for time-invariant sources of scale 
heterogeneity, evaluation error, or miscommunication. But one 
theme in the discussion in Section A was that the processes leading to 
individual SWB responses may change along with the change in 
individual income or other attributes. Intrapersonal scale 
recalibration is just this: an individual with a higher income, health, 
and so forth, may tend to use a different scale to express his 
preferences; this effect will show up in εit rather than in fi, yielding a 
biased estimate of β. Similarly, higher levels of certain attributes may 
cause improvements in individual moods, in turn inducing a 
systematic shift upward in stated life satisfaction. Finally, cultural 
norms encouraging respondents to moderate (or inflate) their stated 
SWB may come into play just when individuals are at higher levels of 
income or other attributes. 
Third, OLS with fixed effects controls for the possibility that 
time-invariant unobserved factors change the intercept of the line 
associating observed factors with stated life satisfaction, but not the 
possibility that these skew SWB in more profound ways. For example, 
individuals with a particular personality trait might be disposed to 
change the slope of the preference-utility function, not just the 
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intercept.117 Fourth, OLS with fixed effects has difficulty producing 
statistically significant estimates for the coefficients on individual 
observed attributes that do not vary much over time. 
Fifth, and this is again a deeper worry, it is hard to see how 
econometric technique, however sophisticated, can cope with a 
certain kind of miscommunication effect. OLS with fixed effects (if 
used to estimate preference utility) starts with the assumption that 
there is a common preference ranking over attributes, captured by a 
common utility function with the form uit = βxit. It then allows for 
random or individual-specific changes in expressed preference utility 
via fi and εit. But if statements of SWB are caused by some feature of 
individuals’ mental states other than their preferences—for example, 
by their moods—it is puzzling how any such statement can be used to 
estimate the preference-utility function. Consider an analogy. 
Individuals may have quantitative beliefs of various sorts (to give one 
example, beliefs regarding the size of the world’s population). These 
beliefs may be caused by various observed and unobserved factors. 
Would it be sensible to estimate the coefficient on these observed 
factors (the extent to which they change an individual’s belief) by 
asking an individual an SWB question? That would be absurd, 
because SWB answers are not caused by beliefs about the world’s 
population. But—if SWB answers are indeed expressions of the 
respondent’s hedonic state, not his evaluation of how fully his 
preferences are realized—why is it less absurd to use SWB answers in 
estimating preference utility? 
Some of these difficulties (although not the last) can be handled 
via instrumental-variable techniques. But these are used fairly 
infrequently in the SWB literature, given that valid instruments for 
income (or other attributes) seem difficult to find in this context.118 
Introducing preference (not merely scale) heterogeneity just further 
complicates the picture. 
C. The Advantages of Stated-Preference Surveys 
A mere recitation of the various pitfalls in using SWB surveys to 
estimate preference-utility may ring hollow. The reader may wonder: 
“Isn’t the issue comparative? Unless you can identify a better 
 
 117. See Clark et al., supra note 114, at C119. 
 118. See Powdthavee, supra note 114, at 79; Paul Dolan & Robert Metcalfe, Comparing 
Willingness-to-Pay and Subjective Well-Being in the Context of Non-Market Goods 20 (Ctr. for 
Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 890, 2008). 
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technique, these pitfalls are unavoidable.” But there is a better 
technique: stated-preference surveys. 
Stated-preference surveys are widely used in applied economics, 
particularly to infer individuals’ WTP/WTA amounts for nonmarket 
goods, and also to make other sorts of inferences about preference 
utility.119 In the form now favored by the economists who use this 
methodology, stated-preference surveys ask respondents to rank 
hypothetical policies, outcomes, attribute bundles, or other items.120 
For example, a survey might show the respondent pictures of current 
air quality versus what the air would look like if a particular 
regulatory policy were put into place. It might then inform the 
respondent that the costs of the regulation would be passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices, and ask whether the 
respondent would approve implementing the policy, given an 
expected increase of some amount in the total cost of certain goods 
he customarily purchases. A “yes” answer might be taken to imply 
that the respondent is willing to pay at least that amount for the 
improvement in air quality. 
Although now widespread, stated-preference surveys remain 
controversial.121 Fully engaging that debate is well beyond the scope of 
this Article. Rather, the claim I wish to make in this Section is 
 
 119. For overviews of this approach, see generally IAN J. BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC 
VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002); RICHARD T. 
CARSON, CONTINGENT VALUATION: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY 
(2011); HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 
2006); A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION (Patricia A. Champ, Kevin J. Boyle & Thomas 
C. Brown eds., 2003); VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES USING STATED CHOICE 
STUDIES (Barbara J. Kanninen ed., 2007); VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 2001); Richard T. Carson 
& W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 821 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2005); L. Venkatachalam, The 
Contingent Valuation Method: A Review, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 89 (2004). 
 120. A different format, less utilized at present, is an “open-ended” question that asks for 
the maximum the respondent is willing to pay for some good. 
 121. See supra note 119; see also FUJIWARA & CAMPBELL, supra note 11; Matthew D. 
Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875 (2006); Richard T. Carson, Nicholas 
E. Flores & Norman F. Meade, Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 173 (2001); Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade, Economic 
Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, 19 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 203 (1999); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as 
a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005); Robert Sugden, 
Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a Discussion of Coping 
Strategies, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2005). 
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conditional. If individuals have sufficiently well-behaved preferences 
to allow for a preference-based account of well-being, and if surveys 
are an appropriate methodology for estimating these preferences, 
stated-preference surveys dominate SWB surveys. The former are 
clearly better in some relevant respects, and no worse in all other. 
A preference-based account of well-being requires that 
individuals’ rankings satisfy formal rationality requirements.122 The 
content of such requirements is contested, but they include—at a bare 
minimum—transitivity. Unless a ranking satisfies formal rationality 
constraints, it may not even be characterizable as a preference, and in 
any event, would be irrational and normatively suspect. 
Some critiques of stated-preference surveys point to anomalies 
suggesting a violation of rationality requirements.123 Scope 
insensitivity (also known as “embedding”) is one such anomaly: 
individuals’ WTP/WTA amounts do not vary appropriately with 
change in the scope of the good being valued. For example, a 
respondent’s willingness to pay for a reduction in fatality risk may 
increase very little even as the risk reduction is doubled or 
quadrupled.124 Large WTP/WTA disparities are another. The amount 
of money that the respondent requires in compensation for not 
having some good (her WTA) may be much larger than what she 
would pay to have it (her WTP)—suggesting that she is envisioning 
attribute packages as losses or gains from a reference point, arguably 
a kind of formal irrationality. 
However, anyone proposing to use SWB surveys as evidence of 
preference utility must presuppose that such irrationalities are not 
widespread or entrenched (for example, that they can be overcome 
via sufficient debiasing or other steps to “construct”125 well-behaved 
preferences). If scope insensitivities, WTP/WTA disparities, and the 
like really prove that most individuals are too irrational to meet the 
formal requirements of a preference-based account of well-being, the 
conclusion should be that we must reject this account entirely, thus 
 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 35–48 (discussing the laundering of preferences). 
 123. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Fall 2012, at 43, 46–49. 
 124. This is a violation of expected utility theory. See James K. Hammitt & John D. 
Graham, Willingness To Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33, 34–35 (1999). 
 125. John W. Payne, James R. Bettman & David A. Schkade, Measuring Constructed 
Preferences: Towards a Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243 (1999). 
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undermining not only stated-preference surveys, but also the PR 
defense of SWB surveys.126 
A second, quite familiar, critique of stated-preference surveys is 
less radical. It asserts that behavioral (“revealed preference”) data is 
stronger evidence of individuals’ real preferences than survey data. In 
particular, it is claimed, individuals have strategic grounds to answer 
stated-preference questions insincerely. It is also suggested (a kind of 
nonidealization point) that respondents have no “skin in the game,” 
no incentive to seriously consider what their preferences are, because 
any answer they give is costless. Stated-preference surveys are 
therefore (it is claimed) subject to “hypothetical bias,” whereby 
individuals tend to articulate higher monetary values for goods than 
they would expend in real transactions.127 
Undoubtedly some types of stated-preference surveys are 
vulnerable to strategic bias, hypothetical bias, or other slippage 
between respondents’ genuine preferences and their answers to the 
survey questions. But that would also surely be true of some types of 
SWB surveys.128 Nor is there any reason to believe that survey design 
improvements intended to mitigate these flaws are especially 
applicable to the SWB format. 
Conversely, if the flaws just mentioned are mitigatable—if 
properly designed surveys are a useful tool to infer preference 
utility—there are several strong considerations in favor of the stated-
preference approach. 
First, as just mentioned, preferences must satisfy formal 
rationality requirements. Some who advocate a preference-based 
account of well-being go further, arguing that the preferrer must meet 
various additional laundering conditions, such as being well-informed, 
calm and deliberative. Efforts to debias respondents, and to furnish 
 
 126. Cf. Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”: 
Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 73 (2003) (finding that 
market behavior may not reveal stable underlying preferences). 
 127. See CARSON, supra note 119, at 13 (noting that hypothetical bias and strategic 
misstatement are two enduring concerns about stated-preference surveys). 
 128. See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy, 38 
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 659, 670 (2012) (“When happiness indicators influence the behaviour 
of political actors and their policy choices, individuals have an incentive to misstate their well-
being.”). 
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information, are a standard feature of stated-preference surveys, but 
not SWB surveys.129 
Perhaps this is remediable. For example, SWB respondents 
could, in principle, be provided a mini-course in utility theory (so that 
they understand how preferences are supposed to behave, and what 
the ordinal or cardinal utility number attached to an attribute bundle 
is meant to represent). Each could be given information about her 
actual attribute bundle, and also asked to carefully consider whether 
she would prefer that bundle to various counterfactual bundles. And 
only then would respondents be asked, “How satisfied are you with 
your own life?” or, less elliptically, “What is your current degree of 
utility?” But this would represent a fairly radical change in how SWB 
surveys are actually conducted. 
A second and more fundamental advantage of the stated-
preference approach is that it is robust to preference heterogeneity—
both interpersonal and intrapersonal. Howard at Time 1 (Howard1) 
may have different preferences from Howard at Time 2 (Howard2), 
and both of the Howards’ preferences may differ from Robert’s. The 
stated-preference approach can, in principle, accommodate this 
heterogeneity. Howard1, Howard2, and Robert can each be asked to 
rank a set of possible attribute bundles. If each has a different 
ranking, that will show up in the data. 
By contrast, the SWB format presupposes some substantial 
degree of preference homogeneity. Even if Howard1, Howard2, and 
Robert each accurately expresses his preference utility for his current 
bundle, there is no way to infer how any of them would rank the set 
of possible bundles if we allow each ranking to be different. 
The fundamental point is that, in the stated-preference format, 
multiple possible attribute bundles are presented to each 
respondent.130 The respondent just tells us directly what his ranking is. 
 
 129. For one particularly intensive effort to encourage deliberation about preferences as 
part of a stated-preference survey, see Douglas MacMillan, Nick Hanley & Nele Lienhoop, 
Contingent Valuation: Environmental Polling or Preference Engine?, 60 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
299 (2006). 
 130. In practice, stated-preference practitioners often use a so-called “dichotomous choice” 
framework which, in effect, asks each respondent to rank only two attribute bundles (bundles 
consisting of some level of a good and some amount of income) out of a larger set. 
Dichotomous-choice questions, besides having desirable properties as regards strategic bias, are 
less cognitively demanding than questions asking the respondent for fuller ranking information. 
Answers to a survey posing each respondent a dichotomous-choice question over some pair of 
bundles, together with assumptions about the homogeneity of respondents’ preferences, can be 
used to infer the common preferences over the entire set. But it is also quite possible to ask each 
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In the SWB format, each member of a group is asked to articulate his 
preference utility for one bundle (his current one). Information about 
counterfactuals—namely, whether an individual would prefer or 
disprefer his current bundle to a different one—is not elicited. 
Without such information, we can only infer whether someone would 
prefer or disprefer his current bundle to a different one if we assume 
that his preferences are to some degree homogeneous with the holder 
of that other bundle.131 
Third, and equally importantly, stated-preference surveys do not 
ask the respondent to translate her ranking of bundles into a utility 
scale and to express her ranking by telling us her utility. Instead, she 
is just asked for the ranking. The whole problem of scale 
heterogeneity, a deep difficulty for SWB surveys (as evidence of 
preference utility), is a non-issue for the stated-preference format. 
This is certainly true if we allow for interrespondent preference 
heterogeneity. And it is true even if we do combine the stated-
preference format with assumptions about preference homogeneity 
so as to increase the inferential power of this approach. 
For example, imagine that we try to infer how each in a group of 
respondents would rank a fairly large set of attribute bundles. It 
seems overwhelming to present the whole set to each, and so we 
assume that all have the same preferences. With this assumption in 
hand, we could administer a stated-preference survey, asking each 
respondent to rank a particular subset of the larger set. With this 
information in hand, together with formal features of preferences 
(transitivity) and the homogeneity assumption, we can reach a 
conclusion about how each in the group ranks the larger set. Nothing 
in this conclusion depends upon a further assumption that each in the 
group expresses these common preferences via a common utility 
scale. 
 
respondent to rank three or more bundles, or to pick the most preferred of three or more 
bundles; and stated-preference surveys sometimes do pose such questions, as in the so-called 
“choice experiment” or “contingent ranking” format.  
 131. Some critics of using stated-preference surveys to estimate WTP/WTA values have 
argued that these surveys impose a cognitive burden by requiring respondents to rank multiple 
bundles—and have suggested that such burden is reduced by the SWB format. See, e.g., Frey et 
al., supra note 11, at 148. But this cognitive-burden defense of the SWB format is persuasive 
only if SWB surveys are taken as evidence of something about respondents other than their 
preferences. The “burden” of ranking multiple alternatives is an inextricable part of having a 
preference. 
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Fourth, stated-preference surveys are less susceptible to the 
miscommunication difficulties that affect SWB surveys. It is hard to 
misunderstand the question, “Which would you choose?” or “Which 
do you prefer?” By contrast, the person asked “How satisfied are you 
with your life?” or “What is your current utility?” (let alone, “How 
happy are you?”) might well misunderstand the question as 
requesting a measure of affect or good feeling—experience utility—
rather than a measure of preference realization. 
III.  SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS AS EVIDENCE OF 
EXPERIENCE UTILITY 
The PR defense sees SWB surveys as evidencing preference 
utility, a measure of the extent to which individuals’ preferences are 
realized (with individuals permitted to have an intrinsic preference 
for items that are at least partly nonexperiential, such as 
consumption, health, liberty, accomplishment, knowledge, and so 
forth). By contrast, the EQ defense argues that SWB surveys provide 
useful information about the quality of individuals’ mental states. 
This defense is, in a way, much more straightforward. Although 
individuals are not infallible about the content of their mental states, 
surely each individual is generally more epistemically reliable about 
what she thinks and feels than about the occurrence of what she 
wants. Moreover, it seems straightforward to design survey questions 
focusing on experiential quality: for example, “How happy are you?” 
Indeed, many scholars in the SWB literature offer (what appears 
to be) some version of the EQ defense. The most prominent example 
is Daniel Kahneman, who argues that information about experience 
utility should play a substantial role in structuring governmental 
choices. Kahneman and his collaborators (for short, “Kahneman”) 
have pioneered a novel framework (“objective happiness”) for 
measuring experience utility, and have empirically implemented this 
framework in several large-scale studies.132 But Kahneman is hardly 
alone in seeing SWB surveys as evidencing experience utility. There 
are numerous other SWB researchers who present—or at least seem 
to present—the EQ defense. 
That defense, once more, can take a strong or weak form. In the 
strong form, the EQ defense of SWB surveys endorses 
experientialism about well-being. A leading example of this approach 
 
 132. See infra Part III.B. 
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is the best-selling book, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science,133 
written by Richard Layard, a prominent SWB researcher. Section A 
responds to Layard’s arguments and, more generally, criticizes the 
strong EQ defense. 
The weak EQ defense is more promising. It refrains from 
endorsing experientialism about well-being. Experientialism about 
well-being is, at a minimum, normatively controversial. The weak EQ 
defense of SWB surveys declines to take sides in that thorny debate. 
It claims only that good experiences are one aspect of well-being—a 
claim which seems very hard to deny. 
More problematic is the assertion that policymakers should take 
account of the experiential impact of governmental policies via SWB 
surveys. In Section B, I illustrate the difficulties with the weak EQ 
defense of SWB surveys via a close analysis of Kahneman’s “objective 
happiness” framework. Kahneman’s work is by far the most 
systematic attempt, to date, to develop a policy-relevant measure of 
mental states. And Kahneman now acknowledges (or at least is 
willing to entertain) that well-being has nonmental aspects. The 
“objective happiness” framework should thus be understood as a 
concrete elaboration of the weak EQ defense: one that sees SWB 
surveys as evidence of experiential quality, and experiential quality as 
one important determinant (among others) of well-being. 
Key objections to the “objective happiness” framework are its 
implausible presuppositions regarding temporal separability and, 
even more fundamentally, the separability of the hedonic from the 
nonhedonic. Relatedly, the framework offers no guidance in how 
policymakers should integrate information about hedonic utility with 
nonhedonic information. Finally, although the theoretical elaboration 
of “objective happiness” uses an “observer” to make time-tradeoff 
judgments so as to cardinalize hedonic utilities, the “observer” is not 
to be found in Kahneman’s empirical studies, and even the theoretical 
elaboration fails to allow for heterogeneity in observer 
judgments/preferences. 
Section C sketches a different and arguably more promising 
approach to integrating information about experiential quality into 
policy choice: an approach that includes happiness as one of the 
entries in individuals’ preference utility functions, and that employs 
 
 133. LAYARD, supra note 10. 
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revealed or stated-preference studies to estimate the extent to which 
preference utility depends upon happiness. 
A. Experientialism about Well-Being: The “Strong” Experience-
Quality Defense of Subjective Well-Being Surveys 
Experientialism about well-being has a distinguished intellectual 
history. Bentham, of course, was an experientialist, and so (in a 
different way) were John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick.134 But, 
more recently, the view fell into philosophical disfavor. The most 
influential twentieth-century work of moral philosophy, John Rawls’s 
A Theory of Justice,135 adopts a preference-based view of welfare, 
rather than equating well-being with pain and pleasure or, more 
generally, good experiences.136 The other leading contemporary 
philosophical works on well-being (here, I am thinking of the work of 
Richard Brandt,137 James Griffin,138 John Finnis,139 Martha 
Nussbaum,140 and Wayne Sumner141) are also nonexperientialist. 
Indeed, for a time, Robert Nozick’s discussion of the “experience 
machine” was generally seen by philosophers as a decisive refutation 
of experientialism.142 Over the last decade or so, some scholars have 
pushed back against this conventional wisdom.143 Still, it remains the 
case that experientialism about welfare is a philosophically 
controversial position. As already explained in Part I, two widely 
accepted classes of well-being accounts—preferentialism (with the 
special exception of a preferentialist view that embraces an 
 
 134. SUMNER, supra note 26, at 83–92. 
 135. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
 136. See id. at 358–80. 
 137. See generally RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979). 
 138. See generally JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND 
MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986). 
 139. See generally FINNIS, supra note 42.  
 140. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 31. 
 141. See generally SUMNER, supra note 26.  
 142. See, e.g., Sharon Hewitt, What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really 
Tell Us About Hedonism?, 151 PHIL. STUD. 331, 332 (2010); Matthew Silverstein, In Defense of 
Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine, 26 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 279, 281–82 
(2000). 
 143. See, e.g., ROGER CRISP, REASONS AND THE GOOD (2006); FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE 
AND THE GOOD LIFE: CONCERNING THE NATURE, VARIETIES, AND PLAUSIBILITY OF 
HEDONISM (2004); FRED FELDMAN, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED HAPPINESS? (2010); Mark 
Bernstein, Well-Being, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 39 (1998); Torbjörn Tännsjö, Narrow Hedonism, 8 J. 
HAPPINESS STUD. 79 (2007). 
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experientialist conception of “self-interested”144) and the objective-
good approach—reject the experientialism requirement. Accounts 
within these classes reject the proposition that the only way to 
directly change someone’s well-being is by changing the content of 
her mental states (what she thinks, feels, remembers, and so forth). 
In Happiness, however, Layard adopts a Benthamite view of 
well-being and of the proper goals for social policy. He writes, “I 
believe that Bentham’s idea”—that “all laws and all actions should 
aim at producing the greatest possible happiness”—“was right and 
that we should fearlessly adopt it.”145 
Happiness almost completely ignores the contemporary 
philosophical debates about well-being. Perhaps that is not surprising, 
given academic specialization (Layard is an economist) and the 
book’s aim to reach a popular audience. Still, one can ask: has Layard 
advanced or at least sketched plausible arguments for why 
governmental policy should be solely focused on promoting individual 
happiness, rather than nonexperiential features of individual lives 
(except as an instrumental means to more happiness)? 
Layard argues as follows: 
  Why should we take the greatest happiness as the goal for our 
society? Why not some other goal—or indeed many? What about 
health, autonomy, accomplishment or freedom? The problem with 
many goals is that they often conflict, and then we have to balance 
one against the other. So we naturally look for one ultimate goal 
that enables us to judge other goals by how they contribute to it. 
  Happiness is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it 
is self-evidently good. If we are asked why happiness matters, we 
can give no further, external reason. It just obviously does matter. 
As the American Declaration of Independence says, it is a “self-
evident” objective. 
  By contrast, if I ask you why you want people to be healthier, you 
can probably think of reasons why—people should not be in pain, 
they should be able to enjoy life and so on. Similarly, if I ask you 
about autonomy you will point out that people feel better if they can 
 
 144. See supra text accompanying note 48; infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text.  
 145. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 111–12. Layard’s book was originally published in 2005. 
Citations are to the revised and updated edition, published in 2011, which added a new part but 
did not change the main text. See id. at xiii. The new part adds little to the original argument for 
happiness maximization, except a slight addendum to the argument about the uniquely self-
evident intrinsic value of happiness. See infra note 154.  
ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  2:56 PM 
1572 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1509 
control their own lives. Likewise, freedom is good because slavery, 
prison and the secret police lead to nothing but misery. 
  So goods like health, autonomy and freedom are “instrumental” 
goods—we can give further, more ultimate reasons for valuing 
them. . . . 
  To help us promote the greatest happiness, we obviously need to 
understand what conditions affect people’s happiness, and by how 
much. This is now becoming possible on an empirical basis. . . . But 
unless we can justify our goals by how people feel, there is a real 
danger of paternalism. We ought never to say: this is good for you, 
even though it will never make you or others feel better. On the 
contrary, if we want to measure the quality of life, it must be based 
on how people feel.146 
After addressing objections to happiness-maximization, Layard 
rearticulates his position in this way: “So we come back to the central 
idea of a humane ethic that values what people want for themselves, 
for their children and for their fellow citizens. And that is their 
happiness.”147 
In these passages, one can tease out three separate lines of 
defense of experientialism about well-being. None are particularly 
persuasive. 
(1) Monism: “The problem with many goals is that they often 
conflict.”148 A view that equates well-being and happiness is 
unidimensional or “monistic.” By contrast, if we allow well-being to 
depend upon both happiness and nonexperiential items such as 
health, autonomy, accomplishment or freedom, it becomes 
multidimensional. On such an account, how is government supposed 
to choose a course of action when the dimensions conflict? 
What this argument overlooks is that there are very well-
developed techniques in economics for assigning a given individual a 
single utility number as a function of her attainment on multiple 
dimensions.149 Conversely, experientialism is hardly a sure recipe for 
avoiding the complexities of multidimensionality. On the most 
plausible accounts, experiential quality is itself multidimensional: a 
matter of good perceptions, cognitions, and memories, not just pains 
 
 146. Id. at 112–13 (footnote omitted).  
 147. Id. at 124. 
 148. Id. at 112. 
 149. See generally RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE 
OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1993).  
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and pleasures. Many SWB researchers see subjective well-being 
(good mental states) as a composite of positive and negative affect 
and feelings of satisfaction.150 Even the narrower, Benthamite view 
may not really be monistic. As discussed at greater length below, 
painfulness and pleasantness may turn out to be separate 
dimensions.151 
(2) Only Happiness Has Self-Evident Intrinsic Value: “Happiness 
is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently 
good. . . . [G]oods like health, autonomy and freedom are 
‘instrumental’ goods—we can give further, more ultimate reasons for 
valuing them.”152 Layard’s idea of “self-evidence” invokes a standard 
feature of normative reasoning, namely that some normative 
propositions might be supported by direct appeal to intuitions.153 
Layard is surely correct that many of his (and this Article’s) readers 
will strongly intuit that happiness has intrinsic welfare value: 
happiness, as such, increases well-being. But many readers will also 
intuit that physical health, autonomy, knowledge, relationships, or 
accomplishment have intrinsic welfare value. This relates to 
pluralism/monism: there is nothing at all confused in having the 
intuition that multiple types of individual attributes, both happiness 
and other goods, are intrinsic welfare components. 
In characterizing happiness as a “self-evident” good, Layard not 
only appeals to intuitions in favor of happiness, but also emphasizes 
the strength of such intuitions. Assume, arguendo, that intuitions 
concerning the welfare relevance of health (for example) are 
generally weaker than intuitions concerning the welfare relevance of 
happiness. It would be a fallacy to conclude that only happiness, not 
health, has intrinsic welfare value. If I intuit that proposition P* is 
true, then (ceteris paribus) my normative views should be consistent 
with P*, even if I hold the intuition with less than complete certainty, 
and even if there is some other proposition P (logically consistent 
with P*) that I intuit more strongly. 
In principle, Layard might try to undercut intuitions concerning 
the welfare relevance of nonexperiential items in a different way, by 
 
 150. For a fuller discussion of the multidimensionality of good experiences, see infra notes 
197–200 and accompanying text.  
 151. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 152. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 113. 
 153. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996). 
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arguing that (a) such intuitions do not survive idealization (with full 
information, and thinking rationally, no one intuits that health, etc., 
has intrinsic welfare value), or that (b) such intuitions are much less 
widely shared than the intuition regarding the value of happiness. The 
first tack seems a nonstarter—undercut by the many serious thinkers 
who have embraced nonexperientialist accounts. The second tack is 
empirically speculative. Layard doesn’t present (or attempt to 
present) evidence to support it.154 And evolutionary considerations 
actually suggest that intuitions supporting the intrinsic significance of 
at least some nonexperiential items are likely to be quite widely 
shared.155 
Layard’s key argument against the intrinsic value of health, 
autonomy, and freedom is yet another one: namely, that we can give 
instrumental reasons for promoting these items. This argument is 
fallacious. Something can be both intrinsically and instrumentally 
valuable. In particular, imagine that there are two intrinsic 
components of welfare: being happy and being healthy. Then we can 
reason instrumentally about health (asking about the effect of health-
promotion policies on happiness), but we can also point to the health-
promotion effect of a policy as an intrinsic reason to support it. 
Symmetrically, we can reason instrumentally about happiness by 
asking about the effect of happiness-promotion policies on health. 
The health benefits of affects and cognitions are in fact a large topic 
of research among public health researchers!156 
Thus, the premise that nonexperiential items possess 
instrumental value, as causal precursors to happiness, does not imply 
the conclusion that they lack intrinsic value. 
(3) Paternalism: “[U]nless we can justify our goals by how people 
feel, there is a real danger of paternalism.”157 Government acts 
paternalistically toward some individual when it restricts her choices 
for her own good—when it limits what she can do, not because of 
third-party effects, but because it believes that she will fail to promote 
her own well-being. 
 
 154. In the new part to his book, added in the revised and updated edition, Layard claims—
without empirical support—that happiness “is the only good which would be generally accepted 
as an end in itself.” LAYARD, supra note 10, at 240.  
 155. See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND 
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 296–327 (1998). 
 156. See Diener & Seligman, supra note 10, at 13–15. 
 157. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 113. 
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Far from being antipaternalistic, experientialism has the real 
potential for paternalism.158 If citizens self-interestedly prefer 
nonexperiential items, a government with a mandate to promote good 
experiences has a justification for restricting or altering their choices. 
For example, if mental health interventions are especially conducive 
to happiness, but some individuals have a substantial intrinsic desire 
to be physically healthy, an experientialist government might try to 
tilt those individuals’ health expenditures away from their preferred 
mix as between physical and mental health. It is preference views—
drawing an equivalence between what someone wants (under 
stipulated conditions) and what is good for that person—that have the 
conceptual resources to resist paternalism.159 Conversely, the possible 
disjunction between the course of action that maximizes the 
realization of someone’s self-interested preferences, and the course of 
action that maximizes the quality of her feelings or experiences, 
renders an experiential account potentially paternalist. 
Layard obscures this potential via his assertion that individuals 
self-interestedly prefer their own happiness. “So we come back to the 
central idea of a humane ethic that values what people want for 
themselves, for their children and for their fellow citizens. And that is 
their happiness.”160 But this is an empirical assertion—one that 
Layard does not back up with evidence, and one that the studies 
reviewed in Part I.B. do not clearly support. 
Of course, the sheer fact that a well-being account is paternalistic 
does not provide a decisive reason to reject it. Intuitively, some 
individuals do fail to promote their own well-being. But SWB 
scholars such as Layard should not inflate the virtues of 
experientialism by obscuring where it stands on paternalism. 
I have parsed Layard’s brief for experientialism and found it 
wanting. But better arguments for his position might be available. 
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur have 
recently offered a lengthy defense of experientially focused policy 
 
 158. Robert Sugden, Capability, Happiness, and Opportunity, in CAPABILITIES AND 
HAPPINESS 299, 300 (Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim & Maurizio Pugno eds., 2008). 
 159. To be sure, preference views become increasingly paternalistic as they impose 
increasingly stringent rationality and informational conditions on preferences. The preference 
component of any such view pushes against paternalism, whereas the idealization component 
pushes toward it. 
 160. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 124. 
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analysis.161 And, as mentioned, some contemporary academic 
philosophers have tried to mount a case for (or at least deflate some 
of the standard objections to) experientialism.162 
To my mind, the strongest reason to endorse an experientialism 
requirement is a reason that Layard does not mention: the “good-for” 
aspect of welfare.163 Well-being is subject-relative goodness. Some 
occurrence enhances Sonya’s well-being only if it is good for Sonya, 
rather than merely being good in an impersonal sense, or good for 
someone else. Call this the “non-remoteness” constraint on well-
being: an occurrence has a direct164 impact on someone’s welfare only 
if it is not too “remote” from her. 
At first blush, the non-remoteness constraint presents a plausible 
case for experientialism. As Shelly Kagan explains: 
  Suppose I meet a stranger on a train. He tells me his story, and I 
form the desire that he succeed in his projects. We then part, and I 
never hear of him or even think of him again. If he does in fact 
succeed, then my desire has been satisfied. According to the desire 
theory, then, this makes me better off. But this is intuitively an 
absurd claim. Obviously my level of well-being is not affected at all 
by the success of the stranger. . . . 
  This suggests that the unrestricted desire theory [of well-being] is 
hopelessly broad. A theory of well-being must explain which facts 
constitute my being better off. So they must be facts about me. Since 
my desires can range over facts that have nothing whatsoever to do 
with me, the satisfaction of such desires cannot constitute my well-
being. . . . 
  From this perspective, the position of mental statism no longer 
seems so arbitrary. At least it seems to keep the content of well-
being within reasonable bounds, for facts about my mental states are 
certainly facts about me. In contrast, it is far from clear whether 
anything external to my mind . . . can count as—in the relevant 
 
 161. See, e.g., Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 10; 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra note 10.  
 162. See supra note 143. 
 163. See SUMNER, supra note 26; Bernstein, supra note 143, at 45–46; Shelly Kagan, The 
Limits of Well-Being, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, June 1992, at 169, 171–72.  
 164. The word “direct” is needed because remote occurrences might have an instrumental, 
causal, impact on someone’s well-being. 
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sense—facts about me. If not, then the limits of well-being must be 
drawn at the limits of our minds.165 
The “stranger” case described by Kagan derives originally from 
philosopher Derek Parfit.166 Eric Posner and I provided a similar case 
in our book on cost-benefit analysis, involving a person named Sheila 
and an endangered species, the Sri Lankan squirrel. 
  One outcome involves . . . the continued existence of the Sri 
Lankan squirrel . . . ; the other is the extinction of this species. Sheila 
has never traveled to Sri Lanka, and never intends to, nor is she an 
environmentalist who’s made species preservation her life’s work, 
but she still (slightly, say) prefers the first outcome because she 
believes that morality includes environmental values disfavoring the 
disappearance of species. It seems odd to say that the nonextinction 
of the squirrel makes Sheila better off.167 
The “stranger” and Sri Lankan squirrel cases underscore the non-
remoteness constraint on well-being. More specifically, within the 
confines of a preference-based account of welfare, they show the 
need to restrict the category of welfare-relevant preferences. The 
cases illustrate that someone might have a fully laundered preference 
(a preference that is well-informed, rational, intelligible, and so forth) 
for outcome x over y, and still not be better off in x than y. In order to 
survive the remoteness objection, the preference-based account must 
say that person i is better off in x than y if and only if i has a self-
interested, laundered preference for x over y. The reasons thus to 
restrict the category of welfare-relevant preferences include not just 
our intuitive reactions to particular hypothetical cases, but also 
deeper considerations regarding the possibility of self-sacrifice and of 
moral reasoning.168 
Kagan concludes, however, that the non-remoteness constraint 
does not, on balance, argue for experientialism. I agree with Kagan. 
In particular, the literature on preferentialism has offered at least 
four possible general solutions to the problem of differentiating self-
interested from non-self-interested preferences.169 (1) Experientialism: 
An individual’s preference is self-interested if and only if the 
 
 165. Kagan, supra note 163, at 171–72.  
 166. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 494 (1987). 
 167. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 32, at 34.  
 168. See id. at 34–35; ADLER, supra note 27, at 174–78. 
 169. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 178–81. 
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fundamental arguments170 for the preference are the individual’s 
mental states. (2) Experientialism plus physicalism: An individual’s 
preference is self-interested if and only if the fundamental arguments 
for the preference are the individual’s mental states or physical states. 
(3) Existence-entailment: An individual’s preference is self-interested 
if and only if the realization of the preference entails the individual’s 
existence. (4) Sympathy: An individual’s preference is self-interested 
if and only if based in self-sympathy, an attitude of care and concern 
for herself. 
The experientialist conception of “self-interested” strikes me as 
too narrow. Surely occurrences within a person’s physical body are 
not “remote” from her. As Kagan explains, even if we insist that a 
preference is self-interested only if its fundamental arguments are the 
person’s nonrelational attributes, that would lead us to conception (2) 
in the previous paragraph, not (1).171 We get from a nonrelationality 
requirement to experientialism only by adopting a controversial view 
of personal identity—namely, that a particular human person is just a 
bundle of psychological properties, rather than a particular human 
being who has a brain and a body.172 Moreover, I would go wider than 
experientialism plus physicalism. Given that practical rationality, 
theoretical rationality, and affiliation are three central capacities of 
human persons—the capacities to make choices in the pursuit of 
goals, to acquire knowledge, and to form relationships with others—it 
seems to me that preferences for success in the exercise of those 
capacities can count as self-interested even if outside the scope of 
conceptions (1) and (2). Such preferences are not merely 
“intelligible” (as I discussed in Part I),173 but intelligible as a matter of 
self-interest. A second case that Posner and I discussed in our book, 
the case of the deceived scholar, illustrates this point.174 
 
 170. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.  
 171. Kagan, supra note 163, at 180–89. 
 172. See generally DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS (2005); ERIC T. 
OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY (1997). 
 173. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text. 
 174. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 32, at 30. Let me modify the case somewhat to highlight 
the connection with goals, knowledge, and relationships. Imagine that David, an academic 
scientist, works hard at his research. He hopes to make a scientific discovery and to be respected 
for doing so by his colleagues. In considering possible outcomes, David says that he prefers x 
(an outcome in which he actually discovers some new and significant scientific fact), as opposed 
to y (an outcome in which he falsely believes to have done so, abetted in this belief by 
colleagues who want to spare his feelings but pity David behind his back). Even though David’s 
mental states are identical in these possible outcomes, there are various important respects in 
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Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur argue that I have “directly 
contradict[ed]” myself in denying that the squirrel’s survival benefits 
Sheila, and yet rejecting the experientialist conception of self-interest, 
conception (1).175 Their characterization, if accurate, would also hold 
true of anyone else who adopts conception (2), (3), (4), or for that 
matter any view which analyzes self-interested preferences other than 
as preferences for experiences. But, in fact, there is no contradiction 
here: just a position intermediate between the narrow insistence that 
what is good for me must occur within my head, and an overbroad 
willingness to include the realization of any preference (including 
Sheila’s, or a preference for the stranger’s success in Parfit’s case) as 
improving my welfare. 
The brief discussion of the last several paragraphs will hardly 
satisfy the proponent of experientialism. The non-remoteness 
problem is very difficult, and the experientialist solution to that 
problem certainly does deserve close and serious consideration. 
Although I believe that this argument for experientialism fails—as do 
others advanced by contemporary philosophical experientialists, and 
by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur—I lack space to pursue the 
analysis here. Notwithstanding Nozick’s “experience machine,” 
experientialism should not be rejected out of hand. 
 
which his preference seems self-interested whereas Sheila’s does not: in y he has failed at his 
career goal, he knows less (and has made no contribution to human knowledge), and a thread of 
deceit runs through his relationships with his colleagues. 
  Note that both conceptions (3) and (4) would count David’s preference for x as self-
interested. A preference that I contribute to finding a cure for cancer—by contrast with a 
preference that a cure for cancer be discovered—is existence-entailing, because all outcomes in 
which I do not exist are ranked equal by the first but not the second preference. David’s 
preference is that he make a scientific breakthrough and that he be respected by his colleagues 
as a result. Moreover, someone caring about David (whether David himself, or someone else) 
would be motivated to pursue x. For example, if David has a sympathetic friend who knows of 
David’s capacity for self-deception, the propensities of David’s colleagues, and so forth, and 
believes that David’s research is heading down a false path—and thus taking David in the 
direction of y not x—the friend might try to get David to redirect his research.  
 175. Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 10, at 1621. They 
also point out that an account of self-interest which categorizes as “self-interested” the deceived 
scholar’s preference for genuine academic success (as opposed to the mere belief thereof) also 
thus categorizes the preference for success of a “driven scholar” willing to sacrifice his happiness 
and family life. Id. at 1625–26. This is true. But it is a further question whether this latter 
preference survives full information and rational reflection on the driven scholar’s part, and yet 
a further question whether it would be widely shared (a point relevant to interpersonal 
comparisons, see ADLER, supra note 27, at 185–225). Note, here, that the critic of the 
experientialism requirement has a pretty easy argumentative burden. What she needs to show is 
that there are some cases in which someone’s well-being is directly improved by nonexperiential 
changes, not that such changes always override experiential losses. 
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Reciprocally, however, SWB scholars tempted to equate well-
being and subjective well-being should recognize that they are 
entering a hornet’s nest of disputation, and should be prepared to do 
serious normative battle in defense of experientialism. Lacking the 
appetite or ammunition for such battle, the SWB scholar might 
instead claim that good experiences are at least one aspect of well-
being, whether or not the sole determinant. 
That claim is hard to dispute. But does it justify the use of SWB 
surveys as a basis for policy choice? It is to that question that we now 
turn. 
B. “Objective Happiness” and the “Weak” Experience-Quality 
Defense 
This Section discusses Kahneman’s “objective happiness” 
approach.176 I remind the reader that “Kahneman” is shorthand for 
Kahneman and the distinguished collaborators with whom he has co-
authored the theoretical and empirical articles developing this 
framework. 
Kahneman disavows (or at least does not commit himself to) an 
experientialist conception of well-being. He writes: 
Defining happiness by the temporal distribution of experienced 
affect appears very narrow, and so it is. The concept of objective 
happiness is not intended to stand on its own and is proposed only as 
a necessary element of a theory of human well-being. A 
comprehensive account of well-being inevitably brings in 
philosophical considerations and a moral conception of “the good 
life,” which are not easily reduced to experienced utility. However, 
good mood and enjoyment of life are not incompatible with other 
 
 176. For the theoretical elaboration of the objective-happiness framework, see Daniel 
Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced 
Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997); Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective 
Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 70, at 
673 [hereinafter Kahneman, Experienced Utility]; Daniel Kahneman & Jacob Riis, Living, and 
Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING, supra note 1, at 
285; and Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 3, 3–12 [hereinafter Kahneman, Objective Happiness]. 
For empirical implementation, see generally MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF 
NATIONS, supra note 4; Kahneman et al., supra note 7; and Alan B. Krueger et al., Time Use 
and Subjective Well-Being in France and the U.S., 93 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 7 (2009). For 
further discussions of the framework, see Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56; Daniel Kahneman 
& Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Winter 2006, at 3; Kahneman et al., supra note 10; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 
121. 
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psychological criteria of well-being that have been proposed, such as 
the maintenance of personal goals, social involvement, intense 
absorption in activities, and a sense that life is meaningful. Clearly, a 
life that is meaningful, satisfying, and cheerful should rank higher on 
the scale of well-being than a life that is equally meaningful and 
satisfying but sad or tense. Objective happiness is only one 
constituent of the quality of human life, but it is a significant one.177 
Kahneman, here and elsewhere, tries to bolster the normative appeal 
of “objective happiness” by stressing that it is “only one constituent 
of the quality of human life.”178 The framework thus merits close 
critical attention, not only in its own right, but as a concrete 
elaboration of the weak EQ defense of SWB surveys. 
The framework offers a methodology for measuring the hedonic 
or affective aspect of individual experience: whether a mental state is 
affectively positive or negative, that is, painful or pleasurable. 
(Kahneman often uses “hedonic,” “affective,” and “pain”/“pleasure” 
interchangeably, and I will follow his usage here.) An experience is 
hedonically/affectively positive, according to Kahneman, if it feels 
good and if the individual wants the experience to continue. An 
experience is hedonically/affectively negative if it feels bad and the 
individual wants it to stop. 
The formal model underlying “objective happiness” presumes 
that there is a neutral hedonic level, and that a given individual (the 
subject), at a given moment, can meaningfully characterize her 
current, momentary, mental state as affectively positive, negative, or 
neutral—as hedonically better than, worse than, or equally good as 
the neutral level. Moreover, she can order possible momentary 
experiences within each of the two affective domains. Given two 
affectively positive experiences, the first can be ranked as more, less, 
or equally positive as the second—various momentary pleasures are 
not just pleasures simpliciter (better than neutral), but more or less 
pleasurable. Similarly, the subject can determine whether one 
hedonically negative momentary experience is more or less negative 
than another. 
 
 177. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 683 (citations omitted). For other 
passages in which Kahneman declines to commit himself to an experientialist account of well-
being, see Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56, at 229–30; Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at 
377 & n.3, Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 121, at 178 n.11; Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176, 
at 288–89. 
 178. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 683. 
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These intra-domain hedonic rankings of momentary experiences 
can be represented (Kahneman assumes) by numbers—by 
momentary hedonic utilities—which, thus far, are merely ordinal. If 
the subject assigns -3 to momentary experience A, and -6 to 
momentary experience B, those numbers mean that both are worse 
than neutral, and that B is more negative than A; the numbers -3 and 
-8 would equally well capture this hedonic information. In order to 
cardinalize momentary utilities, Kahneman introduces an 
“observer.”179 The observer ranks temporally extended episodes 
(“profiles”), each consisting of a series of affective states (positive, 
negative, or neutral) experienced for some length of time. The 
observer’s ranking of the profiles is consistent with axioms of time 
neutrality, monotonicity, and separability. Time neutrality says that 
adding neutral time before or after a profile does not change where 
the profile is located in the observer’s ranking. Monotonicity says that 
replacing one or more positive momentary experiences within a given 
profile with more intensively positive momentary experiences must 
improve how the profile is ranked by the observer, and symmetrically 
for negative experiences. And separability says that the ranking of 
two profiles does not depend on what is experienced during moments 
when experiential quality is the same.180 
If the observer’s ranking satisfies these axioms, then there is a 
cardinal measure of momentary hedonic value—call it the v(.) 
function—such that the observer ranks one profile over another if 
and only if the sum of the duration-weighted v(.) values for the first 
profile is greater than the sum of the duration-weighted v(.) values for 
the second. For example, let profile P consist of experiences A, B, and 
C, each for two units of time, and let P* consist of experience D for 
five units. Then if the observer prefers P to P*, it will be the case that 
2v(A) +2v(B) + 2v(C) > 5v(D). 
The v(.) function is cardinal in the sense that its values are added 
together to yield the overall value of a profile. The v(.) function, 
 
 179. See Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at 388–89, 91; Kahneman, Experienced Utility, 
supra note 176, at 680–81; Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 176, at 5–6. 
 180. It might seem absurd to compare profiles with short temporal duration. For example, if 
P consists of an hour of certain experiences, and P* an hour of different experiences, is the 
observer meant to contemplate a life that endures for only an hour? Or (almost as absurdly) a 
life that is entirely neutral except for P, as compared to a life entirely neutral except for P*? 
Given separability, this problem can be avoided. The observer can rank P and P* by 
contemplating some arbitrary profile M followed by P, as compared to the very same profile M 
followed by P*. 
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strictly speaking, is not unique, but unique up to a positive ratio 
transformation. Thus the summation or averaging of momentary v(.) 
values—and for that matter, the summation or averaging of the 
overall values of profiles—is a meaningful operation.181 Because the 
v(.) function is cardinal, it can serve as the theoretical basis for the 
policy metrics that Kahneman recommends—gross national 
happiness and other such metrics that add or average measures of 
experiential quality across moments and persons. 
To see how information about the observer’s ranking allows us 
to arrive at a cardinal v(.) function, return to the case in which the 
subject experiences A and B as both negative, and A as less negative 
than B. Although this hedonic data—without more—is not sufficient 
to determine whether the numbers assigned to the two experiences 
are -3 and -6, or -3 and -8, imagine that we now learn that the 
observer is indifferent between a profile with T hours of A experience 
and a profile with T/2 hours of B experience. This information 
constrains the v(.) value of A to be a negative number which is half 
the v(.) value of B. Not only must it be the case that v(B) < v(A) < 
0—which follows immediately from the fact that both feel painful to 
the subject, and B feels more painful. In order to represent the 
observer’s indifference between the two profiles just mentioned, it 
must be the case that v(A)T = v(B)T/2, i.e., v(A)/v(B) = 1/2. This fact 
about the observer’s ranking rules out the pair -3, -8. 
To reiterate, the v(.) function is identified as that cardinal 
function which both respects the hedonic intensity of momentary 
affective experiences, as registered by the subject, and additively 
represents the observer’s ranking of all possible temporally extended 
episodes. The observer’s ranking of temporally extended episodes, as 
well as the subject’s felt experience of momentary pains and 
pleasures, plays a critical role—in Kahneman’s theoretical 
apparatus—in arriving at v(.). 
 
 181. Assume that v(.) is such that its duration-weighted values represent the observer’s 
ranking of profiles. Let v*(.) be defined as follows: for every momentary experience A, v*(A) = 
av(A), where a is a positive constant. Note now that duration-weighted v*(.) values equally well 
represent the observer’s ranking of profiles. Why? Let (A, B, …) be a series of momentary 
experiences and (Aʹ, Bʹ, ….) a different series, with each experience A enduring for time t(A). 
Then whenever v(A)t(A) + v(B)t(B) + … ≥ v(Aʹ)t(Aʹ) + v(Bʹ)t(Bʹ) + …, it will also be true that 
v*(A)t(A) + v*(B)t(B) + … ≥ v*(Aʹ)t(Aʹ) + v*(Bʹ)t(Bʹ) + …. Kahneman goes further, showing 
that v*(.) represents the observer’s ranking not just if, but only if, it is a positive ratio 
transformation of v(.). Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at 398–402. 
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The “objective happiness” framework, although an important 
advance, has substantial limitations as a method for integrating 
information about experiential quality into policy analysis—
limitations either in the theoretical statement of the framework or in 
its empirical implementation by Kahneman. Those limitations, I 
believe, are the following. 
1. Is the Hedonic Aspect of Experience Unidimensional or 
Bidimensional?  Kahneman sees hedonic value as unidimensional. 
Pleasure and pain are twin poles of a single spectrum bifurcated at 
hedonic neutrality, just as positive and negative numbers correspond 
to two segments of a single line running through the number 0. 
This assumption of the unidimensionality of affective experience 
is undermined by substantial psychological evidence for a two-
dimensional (or, more generally, higher dimensional) affective 
space.182 Such evidence includes (1) neurological evidence, showing 
that pain and pleasure arise in separate brain regions, which can be 
jointly activated; (2) survey research that looks to how individuals 
describe their current mental state, finding that words expressing 
negative affect (words such as “distressed,” “upset,” “hostile,” 
“irritable,” “scared,” “afraid,” “ashamed,” “guilty,” “nervous,” and 
“jittery”) are surprisingly uncorrelated with words expressing positive 
affect (words such as “attentive,” “interested,” “alert,” “excited,” 
“enthusiastic,” “inspired,” “proud,” “determined,” “strong” and 
“active”); (3) possible behavioral evidence of the dual activation of 
positive and negative affective systems; and (4) introspection, namely 
the possibility of states that are simultaneously painful and 
pleasurable. Nico Frijda eloquently summarizes the introspective 
evidence: 
 
 182. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Relationship Between Attitudes and 
Evaluative Space: A Critical Review, with Emphasis on the Separability of Positive and Negative 
Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401 (1994); Richard J. Davidson, Anterior Cerebral Asymmetry 
and the Nature of Emotion, 20 BRAIN & COGNITION 125 (1992); Ed Diener & Robert A. 
Emmons, The Independence of Positive and Negative Affect, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1105 (1985); Nico H. Frijda, Emotions and Hedonic Experience, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 190; Peter J. Lang, The Emotion 
Probe: Studies of Motivation and Attention, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 372 (1995); Richard E. 
Lucas, Ed Diener & Eunkook Suh, Discriminant Validity of Well-Being Measures, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 616 (1996); David Watson, Lee Anna Clark & Auke Tellegen, 
Development and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS 
Scales, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1063 (1988); David Watson & Auke Tellegen, 
Toward a Consensual Structure of Mood, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 219 (1985). 
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In actual fact, pleasure and pain can coexist at the same moment, 
and they may do so without annulling each other; masochistic 
pleasure is a case in point. Simultaneous arousal of both affects leads 
to complex interactions: the confusing feelings of ambivalence, the 
experience of conflict, a pungency and excitement added to the 
pleasure, a sweetness added to the pain, as in nostalgic 
remembrance. Ambivalence as well as bittersweet experience lead 
to the hypothesis that pleasure and pain are not the opposite 
outcomes of one single process, but the outcome of two somewhat 
independent processes.183 
How, specifically, might the multidimensionality of affect 
jeopardize Kahneman’s framework for measuring hedonic value? For 
simplicity, consider the two-dimensional case (the discussion 
generalizes). Assume that affect is “bivalent”: positive and negative 
affect are not twin poles of a single dimension, but two, orthogonal 
aspects of experience that can be jointly realized: a moment of 
experience can possess positive affect, negative affect, or both. 
Kahneman’s formal model does not appear to cover this last case. On 
that model, negative hedonic utilities are assigned to painful mental 
states, representing that their affective quality is worse than 
neutrality; and positive hedonic utilities are assigned to pleasurable 
mental states, representing that their affective quality is better than 
neutrality. But what sort of numbers should be assigned to bivalent 
experiences? 
Kahneman, indeed, takes very seriously the bivalence objection, 
and at multiple junctures seeks to rebut it. First, Kahneman argues 
that bivalent experiences occur seldomly, because the brain’s pain 
and pleasure systems are mutually inhibitory. 
Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson (1999) point out that positive and 
negative affective states are processed by different neural systems 
and may be activated concurrently. . . . However, the systems are not 
functionally independent, and there is evidence that they inhibit 
each other. Lang (1995) has shown, for example, that watching 
pleasant pictures of food or smiling babies attenuates the startle 
response to a loud sound, whereas startle is actually enhanced in the 
presence of disgusting or horrible pictures.184 
This empirical response argues that, even if the “objective happiness” 
measurement framework is only applicable to a subset of 
 
 183. Frijda, supra note 182, at 195.  
 184. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 682. 
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experiences—univalent ones—the framework remains a useful tool, 
because most experiences are univalent. However, the assertion of 
mutual inhibition and, thus, the rarity of bivalence, are empirically 
contestable. 
But Kahneman also offers a second rebuttal to the bivalence 
objection—one that, if persuasive, would obviate the first. He argues 
(seemingly) that the brain assigns even bivalent experiences a net 
hedonic value, namely on balance positive or negative. 
The bivalent nature of the Good/Bad system is not necessarily 
incompatible with the notion that most moments can be usefully 
characterized by a single value on a bipolar Good/Bad dimension. A 
bivalent system yields a bipolar dimension if the separate 
mechanisms that mediate Good and Bad are mutually inhibitory or 
reciprocally innervated or if the relevant output of the system is the 
difference between the levels of activity of the two 
mechanisms . . . . Davidson (1992) suggested that the brain may 
compute . . . the difference of the levels of activity in the separate 
systems that mediate positive and negative affect. He proposed that 
the [Good/Bad] value corresponds to the difference . . . .185 
If the claim, here, is that any experience feels on balance good or bad, 
that claim is undermined by the introspection data which Frijda 
mentions. But perhaps the claim is slightly different, namely that 
every bivalent experience (although perhaps ambivalent in how it 
feels) corresponds to some univalent experience for purposes of the 
observer’s ranking of temporally extended experiential profiles. The 
claim, thus understood, is no longer about the psychology of 
momentary affect, but rather about how univalent, bivalent, and 
neutral experiences fit together to determine the well-being value of 
profiles. But is the claim true? For example, does a sequence of 
balanced bittersweet moments, wherein pain and pleasure have equal 
intensity, possess just the same well-being value as a sequence of 
neutral moments with neither affective system activated? 
2. Do Observers Have the Same Ranking of Hedonic Profiles?  
Let us ignore, henceforth, the possibility of bivalent experiences. Let 
us also place to one side deep questions regarding the accessibility of 
hedonic (and more generally mental) life, namely whether a subject 
can ever communicate to an observer what she (the subject) is feeling 
 
 185. Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 176, at 8 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted) (citing Davidson, supra note 182). 
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like. Assume, instead, that subjects can classify experiences as 
hedonically good, bad or neutral; can rank experiences with the same 
valence; can describe experiences using labels or instantaneous 
utilities; and that these descriptors more or less succeed in 
communicating to a given observer what the experiences feel like.186 
Kahneman’s formal model assumes a single ranking of “profiles,” 
that is, temporally extended hedonic episodes. In effect, he assumes 
that all observers will converge in ranking any given profile as better, 
worse, or equally good as any other. But why should this be the case? 
Kahneman is ambiguous as to whether observers are meant to rank 
profiles by consulting (a) their preferences (Which profile would I 
prefer to experience?) or (b) their judgments (Which profile do I 
think is better for the subject’s well-being?). In either event, there is 
no good reason, conceptual or empirical, to suppose interobserver 
convergence. 
Understand that interobserver convergence is not entailed by the 
requirement that each observer’s v(.) function respect the subject’s 
rating of momentary experiences, nor by the requirement that each 
observer’s ranking of profiles satisfy axioms of time-neutrality, 
separability, and monotonicity. Two observers might each satisfy all 
these requirements and yet rank profiles differently. 
For example, assume that the subject rates momentary 
experiences A through C as better than neutral and A better than B 
better than C. Observer One is indifferent between T hours of each 
experience and 2T hours of the subsequent experience (so between T 
hours of A and 2T hours of B, and between T hours of B and 2T 
hours of C). Observer Two is indifferent between T hours of each 
experience and 3T hours of the subsequent experience. Then 
Observer One’s ranking is represented by the function v1(.) such that 
v1(A) > v1(B) > v1(C) > 0, v1(A)/v1(B) = 2, v1(B)/v1(C) = 2. Observer 
Two’s ranking is represented by the function v2(.) such that v2(A) > 
v2(B) > v2(C) > 0, v2(A)/v2(B) = 3, v2(B)/v2(C) = 3. 
Each observer’s ranking of profiles (using the sum of duration-
weighted v(.) values) satisfies the axioms of time-neutrality, 
monotonicity, and separability, as well as respecting the subject’s 
feelings. And yet the observers disagree in their ranking of certain 
profiles. For example, it is easy to see that Observer One will prefer 
 
 186. Inaccessibility would jeopardize any approach that counts mental experience as one 
component of well-being (including the approach I argue for in the next Section), not merely 
the “objective happiness” framework. 
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the profile consisting of two hours of B followed by one hour of C, 
over the profile consisting of one hour of A, whereas Observer Two 
will have the opposite preference. 
If observers can have different rankings of profiles, Kahneman’s 
framework for arriving at a cardinal measure of momentary hedonic 
experience collapses. If one observer prefers profile P to profile P*, 
and another observer has the opposite preference, then clearly there 
is no v(.) function such that the sum of duration-weighted v(.) values 
will both assign profile P a greater overall value than profile P*, and 
assign profile P* a greater overall value than profile P. Consider the 
case just mentioned in which Observer One prefers two hours of B 
followed by one hour of C to one hour of A, whereas Observer Two 
has the opposite preference. It is mathematically impossible to find a 
v(.) such that: 2v(B) + v(C) > v(A) and 2v(B) + v(C) < v(A). 
In short, when observers have different rankings of profiles, 
there will be no v(.) function that represents all of their rankings. 
Rather, the cardinal measurement of hedonic experience will be 
observer-relative. Observer One will have a cardinal function v1(.), 
the sum of whose duration-weighted values will represent his ranking 
of profiles; Observer Two will have a different cardinal function v2(.), 
the sum of whose duration-weighted values will represent his ranking 
of profiles; and so on. Policy aggregates such as gross national 
happiness, requiring a cardinal measure of hedonic quality, will also 
become observer-relative. For example, gross national happiness 
might be greater in outcome x than y, as calculated by adding up the 
momentary utilities that track Observer One’s ranking of profiles; but 
greater in outcome y than x, as calculated by adding up the 
momentary utilities that track Observer Two’s ranking of profiles.187 
3. Circumventing the Observer in Empirical Implementation.  In 
his empirical implementation of the “objective happiness” approach, 
Kahneman has not actually surveyed an observer or observers to rank 
hedonic profiles and thereby cardinalize hedonic utilities. (Consider, 
by way of contrast, empirical implementation of the QALY approach 
to policy analysis, in which observer preferences over health states are 
 
 187. Kahneman at one point suggests that ordinal rather than cardinal momentary utilities 
will typically be adequate for policy purposes. See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176, at 290 
(“Except for the rare cases in which cumulative distributions [of moment utility over time] 
cross, the mean (or the median) of the distribution of moment utility is an ordinal measure of 
total utility that can be compared across situations, people and populations.”). The assertion 
that the crossing of cumulative distributions will be “rare” is pure speculation. 
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actually used to cardinalize health values.)188 Rather, Kahneman has 
gone directly from subjects’ descriptions or ratings of their health 
states, to conclusions about their “objective happiness.” 
Circumventing the observers renders the empirical exercise less 
onerous. It also suppresses difficulties that arise when observers have 
divergent rankings. But one can ask whether the results of such an 
exercise have much to do with the account of “objective happiness” 
that Kahneman defends in his theoretical work. 
Consider the study of working women in Texas, which I 
mentioned in the Introduction.189 Recall that each respondent was 
asked to recollect the episodes of her previous day, and to rate each 
episode on various scales of positive or negative affect, all ranging 
from values of 0 to 6: for example, how “happy” she felt on a scale of 
0 to 6 during the episode, how “warm/friendly” she felt, how 
“frustrated/annoyed” she felt, or how “depressed/blue” she felt. A 
measure of the respondent’s “positive affect” during the episode was 
calculated by averaging how she rated the episode on three of the 
scales (happy, warm/friendly, enjoyment), and her “negative affect” 
during the episode was similarly calculated by averaging her ratings 
on six other scales (frustrated/annoyed, depressed/blue, hassled/
pushed around, angry/hostile, worried/anxious, criticized/put down). 
These positive and negative values were averaged, across 
subjects, to yield mean affect ratings of different activities. For 
example, Kahneman found that eating has an average positive-affect 
rating of 4.34, exercise of 4.31, and watching TV of 4.19. He used such 
averages not only to compare the affective value of different 
activities, but also to analyze the diurnal pattern of affect, and to 
assess whether affect is more influenced by an individual’s income or 
her temperament. 
However, the mean affect ratings employed in the Texas study 
seem quite arbitrary—arbitrary from the perspective of Kahneman’s 
own account of objective happiness. Moreover, this is true even if one 
brackets the problem of interobserver divergence. If observers 
converge—a heroic assumption—then Kahneman’s model allows for 
the assignment of observer-independent cardinal values to 
momentary experiences: cardinal values, the duration-weighted sums 
of which correspond to the single ranking of profiles that each and 
every observer shares. As already explained, these cardinal values 
 
 188. See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.  
 189. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
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express time-tradeoff judgments. If v(A) = 3v(B), then every observer 
is indifferent between one hour of A and three hours of B. 
But there is no particular reason to think that the values elicited 
from subjects via the rating question in the Texas study correspond to 
these v(.) values. When a subject says that her happiness during 
commuting was “3” on a 0-to-6 scale, and that her happiness during 
socializing was “5” on a 0-to-6 scale, is she using these numbers to 
express her time-tradeoff judgments? Is she saying that she is 
indifferent between T hours commuting, and 3/5T hours socializing? 
Why assume that this is what she means? Perhaps she means the 
numbers only to have ordinal significance: “5” for socializing and “3” 
for commuting just means that socializing is more pleasurable than 
commuting. Or perhaps she intends the numbers to do more than 
represent the hedonic ordering of experiences, but to communicate 
some feature of those experiences, or of her ranking of temporal or 
probabilistic bundles of experiences, other than her time-tradeoff 
judgments.190  
In his most recent empirical work, Kahneman employs a 
different approach (the “U-index”) to measure the hedonic value of 
moments.191 Subjects are still asked to assign numerical ratings to a 
given episode on different scales of positive and negative affect. But 
the episode is then assigned a value of 1 (if the highest rating was for 
a scale of negative affect), otherwise 0. Kahneman claims that this 
approach is purely ordinal.192 That claim is somewhat suspect.193 A 
 
 190. The numbers might be cardinal, but in the sense of (1) representing the respondent’s 
ranking of lotteries over experiences, as per expected utility theory; (2) representing the 
respondent’s judgments regarding the hedonic differences between experiences; (3) deriving 
from a multiattribute function that aggregates subutility functions corresponding to the multiple 
dimensions of hedonic experience; or (4) communicating a primitive, cardinal measure of the 
felt intensity of the experiences. On this point, note too that QALY values elicited via explicit 
time-tradeoff questions need not—and in practice, do not—correspond to QALY values elicited 
through a direct rating question or the standard-gamble question. See supra note 77. 
 191. Krueger et al., supra note 4, at 9. 
 192. See id. at 19 (stating that “[t]he U-index is an ordinal measure at the level of feelings” 
because the classification of an episode as unpleasant or pleasant “relies purely on an ordinal 
ranking of the feelings within each episode”). 
 193. In the theoretical presentation of the “objective happiness” framework, it is assumed 
that momentary experiences can be compared to the neutral level, and that experiences within 
each hedonic domain (positive or negative) can be compared to each other. So pains are 
ordered, pleasures are ordered, but pains and pleasures are not necessarily ordered vis-à-vis 
each other except in the sense of being categorized as worse or better than neutral. The U-index 
procedure assumes that the intensity of any positive or negative experience can be compared to 
the intensity of any other positive or negative experience. See id. at 19 n.13. It is much more 
contestable whether subjects can make such comparisons. 
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truly ordinal, and more direct, approach would be to ask subjects a 
binary question, namely to characterize each episode as, on balance, 
worse or better than neutral experience—and to assign it the number 
1 in the first case, 0 in the second. But perhaps this direct, binary, 
survey would be unreliable, and the actual U-index methodology can 
be seen as a reliable proxy for it. 
In either event, assigning experiences a number of 1 (for 
unpleasant) or 0, and then adding up or averaging these binary 
numbers, is a very crude way to assess overall or average hedonic 
value of a person or a group. We lose all information about the 
relative intensity of hedonic experiences. Jim’s profile of experiences 
on Tuesday might be assigned a larger average U-index value than 
Jim’s profile today, even though all observers would converge in 
preferring the Tuesday profile or in judging it better.194 The U-index 
study, like the Texas study, avoids the empirical encumbrance of 
actually introducing observers, but it does so at the cost of results that 
seem arbitrary by the lights of Kahneman’s own theory of how to 
measure affects. 
4. Temporal Separability.  Kahneman’s measurement scheme 
assumes the temporal separability of hedonic value. Roughly, this 
means that the sequencing of momentary utility does not affect the 
ranking of temporally extended episodes. More precisely, it says that 
if two episodes have the same hedonic value during some moment or 
moments, the ranking of the episodes does not depend on what 
particular value that is. 
Kahneman’s argument for temporal separability runs as follows: 
The ordering of experiences can affect the utility they confer. For 
example, a strenuous tennis game and a large lunch yield a better 
experience in one order than in the other because the enjoyment of 
the tennis game is sharply reduced when it follows lunch. The 
condition of separability, which states that the contribution of an 
element to the global utility of the sequence is independent of the 
elements that preceded and followed it, is often violated when the 
sequences are described in terms of physical events such as lunch 
and a tennis game. In a moment-based treatment of total utility, 
however, the elements of the sequence that is to be evaluated are 
not events but rather moment utilities associated with events. 
 
 194. Imagine that Jim on Tuesday has more negative moments than Jim today, but that his 
positive moments on Tuesday—when they occur—are intensely positive, whereas nothing so 
joyful happens to him today. 
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Because all the effects of the order of events are already 
incorporated into moment utilities, the order of these moment 
utilities no longer matters.195 
However, Kahneman’s insistence that “the order of . . . moment 
utilities no longer matters” is sheer ipse dixit. We are back to the 
issue of observer convergence and divergence. Might not some 
observers judge/prefer lives that trend upwards in terms of 
momentary hedonic value, just as some judge/prefer lives that trend 
upwards in terms of income or health?196  
5. Integrating Hedonic Value with the Nonhedonic Components of 
a Good Life.  Hedonic value is one determinant of well-being, but not 
the only determinant. It is implausible to claim that an individual’s 
welfare is solely constituted by the affective quality of her 
experiences. First, such a claim would amount to a kind of 
experientialism about well-being; and, as I have already discussed, 
experientialism is quite controversial. 
Second—and independent of the debate about experientialism—
we should reject hedonism about mental well-being, that is, the 
position that hedonic value is the only welfare-relevant aspect of an 
individual’s mental life.197 Various examples can be constructed to 
drive home this point, but consider just one. Cheery is upbeat, but 
forgets much of what happens to him, and his stock of propositional 
knowledge is pretty mediocre. Grumpy goes through daily life in an 
affective state that is at or slightly below neutral, but he is keenly 
focused on the sights and sounds around him, can recollect his past in 
rich detail, and has educated himself in various fields. Assume, 
further, that Cheery and Grumpy are more or less the same in their 
objective characteristics (income, health, job status, social life). Is it 
clear that Cheery lives a better life than Grumpy? Hardly. 
Indeed, hedonism about mental well-being is regularly rejected 
by SWB researchers themselves. Ed Diener, a leading figure, has 
consistently defined subjective well-being as a hybrid of affect and life 
 
 195. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 678.  
 196. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 419–20; see also Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 100–02 
(challenging an approach that measures experiential quality by summing moment utilities, and 
noting both that peak negative and positive experiences have an importance that is 
disproportionate to their duration and that individuals encode experiences in terms of 
“episodes” rather than moments). 
 197. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19 at 1801–04; Loewenstein, supra note 42 at 
94–96.  
ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  2:56 PM 
2013] HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1593 
satisfaction.198 Paul Dolan, Richard Layard, and Robert Metcalfe, in a 
report laying the groundwork for large-scale gathering of SWB 
statistics by the government of the United Kingdom, recommend that 
an individual’s SWB be assessed using three different kinds of 
measures: measures of affect, measures of life satisfaction, and 
“eudaimonic” measures, the last assessing how “rewarding” or 
“worthwhile” individuals perceive their activities to be.199 Kahneman 
himself has reversed course and now concedes: 
[E]xperienced and evaluated well-being should both be measured, 
and . . . the measures should be explicitly separated. Contrary to a 
position that one of us espoused earlier (Kahneman 1999), measures 
of evaluated well-being are not simply flawed indicators of objective 
happiness (experienced well-being). Evaluation and memory are 
important on their own . . . because people care deeply about the 
narrative of their life.200 
However, Kahneman continues to argue that his “objective 
happiness” framework is a good tool for incorporating hedonic value 
into policy assessment. The hedonic utility of the positive and 
negative affective states experienced by each individual should be 
measured separately from whatever nonhedonic attributes are 
welfare-relevant;201 and these hedonic utilities should be aggregated or 
averaged across persons and moments, as in the Texas and U-index 
studies. 
But there are two difficulties—one obvious, the second more 
subtle—with this position. First, the “objective happiness” 
framework, itself, offers no guidance in balancing the hedonic and 
nonhedonic aspects of well-being. Imagine that we predict that a 
policy will increase the average “objective happiness” of some 
population, but reduce some measure of their average nonhedonic 
well-being. Is the policy worthwhile, all things considered? 
The more subtle point is that the very assignment of hedonic 
utilities to individual moments—at least as Kahneman conceptualizes 
it—assumes the separability of hedonic and nonhedonic attributes. 
Remember his formal model. The observer considers temporally 
extended episodes (“profiles”), characterized in terms of the affects 
 
 198. See, e.g., Diener et al., supra note 1, at 277. 
 199. DOLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 6–9.  
 200. Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176, at 289 (citing Kahneman, Objective Happiness, 
supra note 176). 
 201. See id.  
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experienced by the subject during each moment, and ranks these—
yielding a cardinal measure of momentary hedonic experience, what I 
referred to above as the v(.) value of that experience. But—now that 
Kahneman has, properly, conceded the welfare-relevance of 
nonhedonic attributes—the insistence that any given observer has 
such a ranking becomes problematic. 
To be sure, the observer will have a conditional ranking of 
hedonic profiles. Assume that N is a possible profile of nonhedonic, 
welfare-relevant, attributes that a subject might possess. N includes 
both nonhedonic mental attributes (an individual’s memory, 
perceptions, sense of satisfaction, and so forth) and whatever 
nonmental attributes are seen to be welfare-relevant (for example, 
health). H is one possible hedonic profile, that is, a sequence of 
hedonic attributes, H* a second possible hedonic profile, H** a third, 
and so forth. Then the observer will be able to rank NH versus NH* 
versus NH**. We can call this the ranking of hedonic episodes 
conditional on nonhedonic profile N. Similarly, if N+ is a different 
specification of nonhedonic attributes, the observer will be able to 
rank N+H versus N+H* versus N+H**. We can call this second ranking 
the ranking of hedonic episodes conditional on nonhedonic profile 
N+. 
But it is a further question whether the observer’s ranking of 
hedonic episodes is invariant to nonhedonic attributes, namely, that if 
the observer has a particular ranking of hedonic episodes conditional 
on N, then she has the very same ranking conditional on N+, on N++, 
and every other nonhedonic profile. Why believe that invariance 
holds true? Might it not be possible that the observer prefers NH to 
NH* to NH**, but N+H** to N+H to N+H*? Invariance precludes 
interaction effects between affective content, on the one hand, and 
anything else occurring in someone’s life on the other. The preclusion 
of such interaction is highly problematic. For example, who would 
want to experience a mental life in which the pairing of affects and 
memories is random, as opposed to being appropriate to what is 
remembered? Similarly, insofar as health is an intrinsic determinant 
of well-being, why think that the ranking of temporally extended 
sequences of pains and pleasures is invariant to the sequence of 
health states? 
It is tempting to respond that the possible interaction between 
hedonic and nonhedonic attributes is a nuance which policy tools, 
necessarily crude and approximate, may need to ignore. But this 
response misunderstands the objection. Once we have assigned 
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hedonic utilities to moments, we may (for practical reasons) need to 
ignore their correlation with nonhedonic attributes, in evaluating 
policies. However, we still need some rationale for this assignment. 
We still need some theory of what is being measured. Kahneman’s 
theory is that hedonic utilities represent the preferences/judgments of 
an observer, ranking temporally extended hedonic episodes. But—
once interaction effects are allowed into the picture—the observer 
may have no such ranking. If you ask her, “Do you prefer H to H* or 
H* to H?” she may respond: “The question is meaningless. I have 
various conditional preferences/judgments regarding the episodes, 
but no unconditional preference/judgment. To ask me for such a 
preference/judgment is like asking whether I prefer a long-sleeved or 
a short-sleeved shirt, to which I’ll answer, “The first in cold weather, 
the second in warm.” 
C. A Better Approach? 
In this Section, I very briefly sketch a different methodology than 
the “objective happiness” framework for incorporating information 
about experiential quality into policy analysis. I lack space to 
elaborate this methodology at length, but at least I can suggest how 
the limitations in Kahneman’s framework might be remedied. 
A preference-based view of well-being allows for an individual’s 
happiness, or some other aspect of her experiential quality, to be one 
of the fundamental arguments for her preferences. Indeed, it would 
be absurd for the preferentialist to insist that only nonmental 
properties can be intrinsic determinants of well-being! However, the 
simplified utility functions adopted in classical economic theory and 
in much empirical work have ignored experiential arguments. Instead, 
preference utility is often modeled as a function of one or more 
nonmental attributes, quintessentially income, bundles of 
commodities, health, leisure, or the physical state of the environment. 
This sort of simplified model of preferences, while more 
tractable, has a downside when coupled with policy tools such as cost-
benefit analysis. Policy impacts on happiness, and thus on well-being, 
cannot be directly measured. Instead, it must be assumed (plausibly) 
that policies causally affect happiness via changes to individuals’ 
nonmental attributes and (less plausibly) that individuals can 
accurately predict how changes in nonmental attributes affect their 
happiness and thus that their intrinsic preferences for happiness are 
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fully captured by the instrumental component of their preferences for 
nonmental attributes.202 
A richer model of preferences explicitly includes experiential 
properties. A given attribute bundle A is characterized as A = (M, N), 
where M describes one or more types of mental attributes, and N 
nonmental attributes. For short, call this a “hybrid bundle.” 
Individual i’s preferences over hybrid attribute bundles are inferred 
from stated-preference surveys or, perhaps, behavioral evidence. 
Individual i’s ordinal preference-utility function for hybrid bundles 
captures his ranking of these bundles. That ordinal preference-utility 
function takes the form ui(M, N). If income is included among the 
nonmental attributes, this ordinal preference-utility function is 
sufficient to determine individual i’s willingness to pay/accept for 
changes in the mental attributes. 
Information about individual WTP/WTA for experiential 
changes allows for the direct incorporation of such changes in policy 
modeling. For example, imagine that a costly proposed regulation, 
lowering the ambient level of some feared environmental toxin, will 
have the benefit of reducing deaths and injuries and reducing anxiety 
about the toxin. Information about individual WTP/WTA for fear 
and anxiety allow us to undertake a cost-benefit test of the regulation 
that explicitly identifies fear-reduction as a separate “good” 
additional to physical harm-avoidance. 
An individual’s cardinal utility function for hybrid bundles would 
be determined by her ranking of bundles plus further facts about her 
preferences (for example, her ranking of bundle lotteries or her time-
tradeoff preferences). Such cardinal utility functions are not required 
by cost-benefit analysis but might be required by other policy tools 
(for example, a GDP-like measure that aggregates/averages 
preference-utility across persons, with preference-utility in turn 
dependent on both experiential and nonexperiential attributes). 
The approach now under discussion might seem utopian (or 
dystopian, for skeptics about policy analysis) but in fact has some 
precedent in existing empirical work. A small literature does try to 
estimate individual WTP/WTA for fear and anxiety (with application 
both to environmental regulation and to policing strategies that 
 
 202. The literature on errors in individual affective forecasting makes this latter premise less 
plausible. See, e.g., Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 121, at 168–73. 
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mitigate the fear of crime).203 The QALY literature looks at individual 
preferences over health states. The QALY number assigned to a 
health state (between 0 and 1) captures such preferences, for 
example, time-tradeoff preferences as between living a period of time 
in perfect health and living longer in a poorer health state. The health 
states thus valued sometimes encompass mental, not just physical 
health. It is not unusual to find QALY values for conditions such as 
depression, pain, or chronic anxiety.204 
Estimating individuals’ preference-utility for hybrid bundles via 
standard preference-elicitation techniques (stated-preference surveys 
or inference from behavioral evidence) is to be sharply distinguished 
from the methodology criticized in Part II: using SWB surveys as 
evidence of preference utility, that is, taking an individual’s stated life 
satisfaction when in possession of bundle A as his preference utility 
for A. What is being recommended is not that an SWB number be 
employed as a proxy for preference utility, but rather that an 
individual’s experiences be included among the determinants of 
preference utility. 
Indeed, this approach does not essentially rely upon the 
assignment of numbers to mental states. In a stated-preference 
survey, the experiential component of a hybrid bundle could be 
described via a number (“imagine experiencing pain that you might 
rate at 4 on a scale of 1 to 5”), but it could also be described 
qualitatively—and indeed a qualitative description might be more 
successful in accurately communicating to respondents what the state 
feels like. 
The approach also has key advantages over Kahneman’s 
“objective happiness” framework. First, although that framework 
seeks only to quantify the well-being impact of affective states, in a 
hedonic utility number, the “hybrid bundle” approach is more 
generic. If A = (M, N), with M mental attributes, M itself might be 
unidimensional or multidimensional and, in either event, might 
include affective states, memory, cognition, sense of satisfaction or 
purpose, and so forth. Second, the “objective happiness” framework 
 
 203. E.g., Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear 
and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1024–30 (2004); Paul Dolan, Graham Loomes, Tessa 
Peasgood & Aki Tsuchiya, Estimating the Intangible Victim Costs of Violent Crime, 45 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 958, 959–64 (2005). 
 204. See Adler, supra note 203, at 979–80, 1043–52; Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood, 
Estimating the Economic and Social Costs of the Fear of Crime, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 121, 
126 (2007). 
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may be undermined by the bivalence of pain and pleasure—the fact 
that positive and negative affect may really be two, separate, 
dimensions of experience—but the hybrid-bundle approach is 
perfectly compatible with affective bivalence. Third, the hybrid-
bundle approach is not committed to any kind of separability with 
respect to an individual’s ranking of bundles: temporal separability, 
the separability of hedonic value from other aspects of experiential 
quality, or the separability of hedonic and nonmental attributes. 
Fourth, the approach provides a basis for making all-things-
considered policy judgments, integrating information about policy 
impacts on experiential quality with other sorts of impacts. If we 
know someone’s preference utility for different hybrid bundles, then 
we know how she makes tradeoffs between the experiential and 
nonexperiential components of these bundles. The governmental 
choice between multiple policies, characterized by different kinds of 
experiential and nonexperiential effects, can then be a function of the 
totality of individual tradeoffs—as operationalized via cost-benefit 
analysis (the sum of individual WTP/WTA amounts), or perhaps in 
some other way. 
Fifth, at least insofar as this approach seeks only to infer 
individuals’ ordinal preference-utility functions—which is all that is 
required for purposes of CBA and the determination of WTP/WTA 
amounts—the approach does not presuppose that individuals have 
the same preferences.205 The ranking of hybrid bundles can vary from 
individual to individual. By contrast, as we have seen, Kahneman’s 
“objective happiness” framework makes the implausible 
presupposition that “observers” will have the very same ranking of 
temporally extended hedonic episodes (“profiles”).206 
The elicitation of preference utility for hybrid bundles 
presupposes that individuals have well-behaved preferences over such 
bundles—if not initially, then at least after debiasing and information-
 
 205. Let x and y be two outcomes. In order to determine what a given individual is 
WTP/WTA for the move from x to y, all we need to know, in principle, is how he orders 
attribute bundles (including both income and whatever non-income attributes are specified in 
the outcomes). This ordering is captured by his ordinal utility function. Moreover, individuals i 
and j might have different rankings of attribute bundles, and suitable estimation techniques 
(such as stated-preference surveys) are robust to such heterogeneity. See supra Part II.C. 
  Admittedly, if we were to compare x and y by using a cardinal utility function for 
attribute bundles, heterogeneity in utility functions would become a problem. Comparing the 
sums or averages of bundle utilities using one method for assigning cardinal utilities could yield 
a different result than comparing those sums or averages using a different method. 
 206. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
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provision. Preference skeptics will deny this, pointing to violations of 
rationality conditions207—and this challenge is a serious challenge to 
the “hybrid bundle” approach. But, as I have just reminded the 
reader, Kahneman’s theory for assigning hedonic utilities to moments 
also depends upon an observer having a preference/judgment ranking 
of hedonic profiles. This observer is suppressed in Kahneman’s 
empirical work—with consequent difficulties that I elaborated upon 
in discussing the Texas and U-index studies. It is ironic that 
Kahneman, in some scholarship, comes across as an ardent 
preference skeptic.208 If actual individuals (even after debiasing) are 
incapable of satisfying rationality conditions requisite for holding a 
preference, then who is the observer whose well-behaved ordering of 
profiles is supposed to satisfy such conditions? In short, Kahneman’s 
“objective happiness” framework is no more immune from 
preference skepticism than the hybrid-bundle approach. 
CONCLUSION 
Enthusiasm about the policy role of SWB surveys is premature. 
Why think that the number which someone assigns to her momentary 
or overall happiness, life satisfaction, positive or negative affect, or 
some other aspect of her experiential state offers real help in 
evaluating governmental policies? Two different answers to this 
question need to be teased apart. One says that a higher self-rated 
degree of life satisfaction shows that the respondent’s preferences are 
more fully realized. In short, SWB surveys evidence preference utility. 
But the evidence would seem to be pretty poor. Preference and scale 
heterogeneity hamper the use of self-rated life satisfaction to make 
inferences about preference utility. Even if all respondents share the 
same underlying preferences and utility function, someone’s answer 
to an SWB survey may well be skewed by evaluation error or 
miscommunication. This number may well be an inaccurate and, 
indeed, statistically biased indicator of the degree to which her life-
circumstances realize her preferences. 
 
 207. Either the minimal conditions required to have a preference at all, or the conditions 
requisite for the preference to have normative “bite.” See supra notes 35–48. 
 208. See Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56, at 215–16 (questioning the usefulness of 
measures of “decision utility,” that is, preference utility, as a basis for valuing health states, 
because individuals’ preferences regarding health are inevitably biased to some extent); 
Kahneman et al., supra note 121, at 228–29 (claiming that “people are better described as having 
attitudes than preferences,” with attitudes “lack[ing] some of the essential properties that 
economic theory requires of preferences”). 
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Stated-preference surveys dominate SWB surveys as evidence of 
preference-realization. Anomalies using the stated-preference format 
suggest the importance of debiasing preferences—rendering them 
rational and well-informed. Perhaps debiasing is fruitless. But that 
would show that government policy choice must (somehow) find a 
normative foundation other than individuals’ preferences, and not 
that preferences should be inferred via the SWB technique. 
Skepticism about the rationality of preferences hardly advances the 
PR (preference-realization) defense of SWB surveys. 
The second answer to the “why” question takes a different tack, 
suggesting that a happiness, affect, or life-satisfaction rating is a 
measure of experiential quality. Thus goes the EQ defense of SWB 
surveys. Kahneman’s “objective happiness” framework—using SWB 
surveys focused on momentary hedonic quality—is an important first 
step in developing a policy-relevant measure of experiential quality. 
Kahneman does not argue that well-being and good experiences are 
equivalent—but rather, much more plausibly, that good experiences 
are one important aspect of well-being. 
However, a close examination of the “objective happiness” 
framework suggests significant limitations. The framework purports 
to cardinalize momentary hedonic utilities by appealing to an 
“observer’s” ranking of temporally extended hedonic episodes, but 
presupposes—without justification—that observers have the same 
ranking, and that these rankings are separable from nonhedonic 
attributes. In empirical implementation, Kahneman has suppressed 
the observer and, most recently, abandoned any attempt at 
cardinalization—via a “U-index” that merely reports the fraction of 
time that individuals spend in an affectively unpleasant state. This is a 
crude measure of hedonic quality (let alone the nonhedonic aspects of 
experiential life, such as memory or a sense of meaning), because it 
does not tell us about the intensity of individuals’ affective states. 
It remains unclear whether SWB surveys—asking for a 
numerical rating of experiences—should be the central tool for 
incorporating information about experiential quality into policy 
analysis. At least in principle, a different approach, more closely 
continuous with traditional cost-benefit analysis, is available: namely, 
to use revealed or stated-preference evidence to infer individuals’ 
preferences over “hybrid bundles,” comprising both experiential and 
nonexperiential attributes. SWB surveys are at most an ancillary 
component of this approach. Its central focus is inferring preference 
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utility, with experiential attributes merely one entry in the utility 
function. 
Much more work remains to elaborate both this approach and 
frameworks (such as “objective happiness”) that revolve around SWB 
surveys. In undertaking this effort, scholars should exercise caution, 
taking care not to muddy their concepts—taking care to understand 
that well-being need not reduce to good experiences, that individuals 
can have intrinsic preferences for aspects of their lives other than 
their mental states, and that someone’s perceived degree of happiness 
or life satisfaction can diverge from her true preference utility. 
